USA v. Wiggins, Joni L., (7th Cir. 2005)
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UNPUBLISHED ORDER Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53United States Court of AppealsFor the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604Argued April 20, 2005 Decided May 27, 2005BeforeHon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit JudgeHon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit JudgeHon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit JudgeNo. 02-3645UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, Appeal from the United States District Court for the SouthernDistrict of Illinoisv. No. 01CR40057-002-JPGJONI WIGGINS, Defendant-Appellant.J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.O R D E RJoni Wiggins pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to manufacture more than 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced to a term of 240 months§ 2D1.1(b)(1), and obstructed justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Wiggins argues that she is entitled to be resentenced because the district court erroneously placed the burden of proof on her to disprove the enhancements rather than on the government to establish them by a preponderance of the evidence. The government concedes error, and we vacate and remand for resentencing.Wiggins and four others were indicted in September 2001 for conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine over a period of several years. The police investigation as it related to Wiggins culminated with the execution of a search warrant at her home that yielded methamphetamine, several precursor chemicals, and seven firearms. Wiggins later explained that the basic outline of the group§ 3C1.1, the government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such an enhancement is warranted. United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ewing, 129 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 200 (3d Cir. 2003) (district court erred by requiring defendant to disprove obstruction of justice enhancement, though error held to be harmless). The trial court, however, did not place the burden on the government and instead required Wiggins to prove that the enhancement was not warranted. The district court§ 2D1.1(b)(1). Under § 2D1.1(b)(1), the government must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed a gun, and then the defendant must show that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug offense. United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1026 (7th Cir. 2002). The government concedes that the district courtÂ’s statement could be interpreted as placing the burden of proof on Wiggins from the outset, rather than first requiring the government to meet its burden of proof and then shifting the burden to her. WigginsÂ’s sentence is VACATED and this case is REMANDED for resentencing. The district court will consider United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), when reimposing sentence.
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This document cites
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Noble, Defendant-Appellant., 246 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2001)
- US Code - Title 21: Food and Drugs - 21 USC 841 - Sec. 841. Prohibited acts A
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - United States of America v. Robert E. Brennan, Appellant., 326 F.3d 176 (3rd Cir. 2003)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lynell R. Ewing, Defendant-Appellant., 129 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 1997)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley Starks and Latray Mcmurtry, Defendants-Appellants., 309 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 2002)
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