Shechet v. Favali [Summ. Ord.], (2nd Cir. 2006)
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER
AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY
OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY
OTHER COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR
IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 9th day
of May, Two Thousand and Six.
PRESENT: WILFRED FEINBERG,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Circuit Judges, and
GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge.1 JACOB SHECHET, Plaintiff-Appellant, -v.- No. 05-5027-cv ABBY FAVALI Corp. Counsel NYC, JOHN DOE Corp. Counsel NYC, JANE DOE Corp. Counsel NYC, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, City of NY, Defendants-Appellees. Jacob Shechet, pro se. FOR APPELLANT: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Mukasey, C.J.).
Plaintiff-appellant Jacob Shechet appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Mukasey, C.J.), entered on June 30, 2005, dismissing his civil rights complaint with prejudice. The District Court, acting sua sponte, held that Shechet's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they arise from the same "transactions or occurences" as claims asserted by Shechet in a prior case filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claims that were dismissed in that case for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the so-called "Rooker/Feldman" doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). (Appx. 13-15.) For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Res judicata is inapplicable where, as here, the dismissal of a claim in a prior case is not on the merits, but rather is based on lack of jurisdiction. See RX Data Corp. v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 684 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (res judicata applies to final judgment on merits); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(b) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction not adjudication on merits). The doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, is potentially applicable to the resolution of the Rooker/Feldman issue in the Eastern District case. RX Data Corp., 684 F.2d at 198; GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
However, unlike res judicata, see Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981), "`a judicial declaration intervening between the two proceedings may so change the legal atmosphere as to render the rule of collateral estoppel inapplicable.'" Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Enters., Inc., 409 F.3d 26, 37 (2d Cir. 2005), quoting Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 600 (1948) (footnote omitted). Such a change in the "legal atmosphere" occurred here. After the Eastern District dismissed Shechet's first case, but before the District Court dismissed the instant one, the Supreme Court sharply narrowed Rooker/Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
That narrowing of the doctrine is relevant here. Shechet complains that defendantsappellees violated his civil rights during state-court proceedings that resulted in two childsupport orders against him. However, Shechet does not seek reversal of the child-support orders § 1983, for defendants-appellees' conduct during the state-court proceedings. (Appx. 12.) Providing such relief would not require disturbing the child-support orders themselves, and thus, under Exxon, this case presumably avoids Rooker/Feldman's jurisdictional bar.
That is not to hold definitively that Shechet's claims are not barred by Rooker/Feldman, only that Exxon so changes the rules regarding that doctrine that the claims should not be precluded based solely on the Eastern District's resolution of that issue. Cf. 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4425, available at FPP s 4425 (Westlaw) ("Preclusion is most readily defeated by specific Supreme Court overruling of precedent relied upon in reaching the first decision. Major changes in broader philosophical approach to constitutional issues may do as well. Supreme Court clarification of issues that had been debated or uncertain in the lower courts is again a proper justification for avoiding preclusion." (footnotes omitted)). On remand, the District Court should reconsider the jurisdictional issue in light of Exxon.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is hereby REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
FOR THE COURT: Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk By:
1 The Honorable Gerard E. Lynch, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
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This document cites
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - Josefina Legnani, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., (Alitalia Airlines) Defendant-Appellee., 400 F.3d 139 (2nd Cir. 2005)
- U.S. Supreme Court - District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)
- U.S. Supreme Court - Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981)
- U.S. Supreme Court - Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948)
- U.S. Supreme Court - Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
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