Scott Whitaker v. Lee Memorial Health System, (11th Cir. 2006)
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[D O NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 21, 2006
THOMAS K. KAHN
N o . 05-15479
CLERK
N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar
D . C. Docket No. 05-00072-CV-FTM-29-DNF
S C O T T WHITAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM,
a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant-Appellee.
A p p e al from the United States District Court
fo r the Middle District of Florida
(A p ril 21, 2006)
B efo re MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
P E R CURIAM:
S c o tt Whitaker appeals the dismissal of his complaint against Lee Memorial
H ealth System in which he asserted claims of breach of contract and violations of eq u al protection and due process. Because Whitaker's federal claims fail but W h itak er stated a claim of breach of contract, as a third party beneficiary, we affirm in part and reverse in part the dismissal of his complaint.
I. BACKGROUND From September 14, 2003, to September 17, 2003, Whitaker was treated by L ee Memorial for injuries he received in an automobile accident. At the time of h is treatment at Lee Memorial, Whitaker was covered by two policies of insurance, an d he had claims for benefits under those policies as a result of the accident.
Whitaker was also insured with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida. To secure c o m p e n s a tio n for its treatment of Whitaker, Lee Memorial asserted a statutory lien ag ain st the proceeds of Whitaker's insurance policies.
Whitaker sued Lee Memorial in federal district court and alleged breach of co n tract both as a party and a third-party beneficiary, and violations of his rights to eq u al protection of the laws and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whitaker alleged that Lee Memorial was bound by contract with Blue Cross and B lu e Shield to seek payment from Blue Cross and Blue Shield and that Whitaker w as a third party beneficiary of that contract. Whitaker alleged that, by placing a lie n against the proceeds of his automobile insurance policies, Lee Memorial was in breach of its contract and was attempting to deprive Whitaker of his property in v io latio n of equal protection and due process. Whitaker alleged that patients who w ere accident victims were treated differently than patients who were non-accident v ictim s because Lee Memorial accepted health insurance payments on behalf of the latter group while not accepting health insurance payments on behalf of the former.
Lee Memorial moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim a n d lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion in part an d granted the motion in part. The district court concluded that the complaint did n o t state a claim for violation of equal protection because the complaint did not alleg e any facts that showed that Whitaker was treated differently than similarly situ ated patients, namely, patients whose injuries resulted from a motor vehicle accid en t and who were covered by automobile insurance in addition to health in su ran ce. The district court also concluded that the complaint did not allege the lack of a rational basis for the disparate treatment of patients who were accident v ic tim s as opposed to patients who were non-accident victims. The district court d ism issed the due process claim because it concluded that the complaint did not alleg e the deprivation of a fundamental right. The district court dismissed the claim s for declaratory judgment because the complaint did not state an independent b asis for federal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Whitaker's third-party b en eficiary claim, without prejudice, for failure to allege that Lee Memorial and B lu e Cross and Blue Shield entered the contract with the intent to benefit W h ita k e r. Finally, the district court concluded that the complaint did state a breach o f contract claim but declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the claim.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim u p o n which relief may be granted de novo. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1 0 0 8 , 1012 (11th Cir. 2005). "On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, w e accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint." Id.
III. DISCUSSION W h itak er challenges both the dismissal of his federal claims and the d ism issal of his third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim. We address first W h itak er's federal claims. Second we address the third-party beneficiary claim.
"The central mandate of the equal protection guarantee is that `[t]he so v ereig n may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on d ifferen ces that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.'" Lofton v. S ec'y of Dep't of Children and Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (q u o tin g Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 (1983)).
Equal protection does not forbid legislative classifications, and "[u]nless the ch allen g ed classification burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class, the E q u al Protection Clause requires only that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 818 (citing Romer v. Evans,
Whitaker argues that there is no meaningful distinction between Blue Cross in su red s who have claims against third parties because of an accident and Blue C r o s s insureds who do not have claims against third parties. Whitaker argues that th e application of Florida lien statute by Lee Memorial to accident victims was ir ra tio n a l and a violation of Equal Protection and Due Process. Whitaker argues th at, because Lee Memorial is bound by contract to accept payment in full from B lu e Cross and Blue Shield, there is no debt against which Lee Memorial can ratio n ally attach a lien. This argument fails.
The decision of Lee Memorial is clearly rational. Lee Memorial seeks to reco v er the full amount of the cost of services it provided to Whitaker from W h itak er's automobile insurance providers, but Lee Memorial rationally does not seek full recovery from patients who do not have coverage under policies of a u to m o b ile insurance. That the contract with Blue Cross and Blue Shield may p r e clu d e recovery against the automobile policies does not make the action taken b y Lee Memorial irrational. In short, Whitaker cannot make a federal case out of a claim of breach of contract on the ground that one party to the contract is a g o v ern m en t actor.
Although the district court correctly concluded that Whitaker's federal c la im s fail, the district court erroneously dismissed one of Whitaker's claims under state law. Whitaker correctly argues that his complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for third-party beneficiary of the contract between Lee Memorial and B lu e Cross and Blue Shield. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides only th a t a complaint must give a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that th e pleader is entitled to relief." "Such a statement must simply `give the d efen d an t fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2 0 0 2 ) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957)).
Whitaker alleged that he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract b etw een Blue Cross and Blue Shield and Lee Memorial. Because the allegations are sufficient to give Lee Memorial fair notice of Whitaker's claim and the grounds fo r the claim, Count III states a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION T h e dismissal of Whitaker's complaint is affirmed as to the equal protection a n d due process claims and reversed as to Count III, the third-party beneficiary claim . Count III is remanded to the district court. On remand, the district court is free to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND R EM A N DED .
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This document cites
- U.S. Supreme Court - Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)
- U.S. Supreme Court - Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - Heather Gary, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. City of Warner Robins, Georgia, Defendant-Appellee., 311 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2002)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - Steven Lofton, Douglas Houghton, Timothy Acaro, Next Friend of John Doe and John Roe, Wayne Smith, Daniel Skahen, John Doe, John Roe, Minor Children, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Angela Gilmore, Et Al., Plaintiffs, v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, (Formerly H.R.S.), District Administrator, District Xi of Florida Department of Children and Family Services, Defendants-Appellees, Charlie Crist, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Defendant, Robert Pappas, District Administrator, District X of Florida Department of Children and Family Services, Defendant-Appellee., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - Mary Chris Sheppard; Robert Sheppard, Plaintiffs, Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. River Valley Fitness One, L.P. D/B/a River Valley Club; River Valley Fitness Associates, Inc.; Joseph Asch; Elizabeth Asch; River Valley Club Gp Llc, Defendants, W.E. Whittington Iv, Appellant, Cross-Appellee., 428 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)
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