Robinson v. Lockheed Martin Corp, (3rd Cir. 2007)
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
U N IT E D STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F O R THE THIRD CIRCUIT
N O . 06-1704
M A R K ROBINSON,
A p p e lla n t
v. L O C K H E E D MARTIN CORPORATION
O n Appeal From the United States District Court
F o r the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D .C . Civ. No. 04-cv-3143)
D is tric t Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter
S u b m itte d Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
D E C E M B E R 26, 2006
B e f o re : SLOVITER, MCKEE AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(F ile d : January 8, 2007
O P IN IO N
P E R CURIAM
T h is is an appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment in
f a v o r of Lockheed Martin Corporation ("Lockheed Martin") on Mark Robinson's claims
th a t Lockheed Martin terminated his employment in violation of the Americans With
D is a b ilitie s Act ("ADA"), 42U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human R e la tio n s Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 951, et seq.1 We will affirm.
I.
Lockheed Martin employed Robinson for computer desktop support. His s e rv ic e began in 1984. In March 2000, Robinson suffered a seizure at work and was tra n s f e rre d to a hospital. While at the hospital, Robinson suffered a second seizure. He w a s out of work on approved disability leave for approximately four weeks. Robinson w a s subsequently diagnosed with a "seizure disorder." Robinson returned to work on or about April 25, 2000. On that date, R o b in s o n 's supervisor, Brad Altemose, purportedly berated Robinson because he was not p u llin g his own weight in the group. Subsequently, two months later, Robinson's annual p e rf o rm a n c e review by Altemose indicated that Robinson "needs improvement." 2 In January 2002, Robinson met with his subsequent supervisor, George M u rp h y, and a human resources representative, Larry Fleisher. The purpose of this m e e tin g was to put Robinson on a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP"). At this m e e tin g , Robinson questioned Murphy and Fleisher about whether his medical condition w a s taken into account. Robinson was not put on a PIP. Robinson submitted a letter 1 Robinson's complaint also included a claim under the Age Discrimination in E m p lo ym e n t Act, 29U.S.C. § 621, et seq. However, Robinson withdrew this claim in the D istric t Court.
2 Robinson's previous performance reviews ranged from excellent (1990-92), to s a tis f a c to ry (1992-94, 1997-99, 2000-01) to needs improvement (1994-97, 1999-2000). f ro m his doctor stating that he should work in a stress-free work environment. Lockheed M a rtin 's medical director's attempts to follow up with Robinson's doctor through R o b in s o n were unsuccessful.
At or around the time of the January 12, 2002 meeting, Robinson had a c o n v e rs a tio n with Murphy. Murphy suggested to Robinson that "he needed to file for an F M L A so that when he felt he couldn't come to work because of this documented co n d ition , he would charge that and not `[absent].'" A c c o rd in g ly, Robinson submitted forms to begin the process of seeking le a v e. Before Robinson had the opportunity for leave, he was terminated from e m p l o ym e n t along with three other co-workers. Lockheed Martin submits that these f irin g s were the result of budgetary cutbacks and that it applied neutral criteria in d e te rm in in g which employees were terminated.
Robinson filed this complaint in July 2004. After the close of discovery, L o c k h e ed Martin successfully moved for summary judgment. Robinson timely filed a n o tic e of appeal.
II.
W e review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See McGreevy v. S tro u p , 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing th e evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue of m a te ria l fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Saldana v . Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III.
C la im s pursuant to the ADA are analyzed under the burden-shifting f ra m e w o rk announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1 9 7 3 ).3 See Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., Parkway Hosp. Div., 60 F.3d 153, 157 ( 3 d Cir. 1995). In order to make out the prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must s h o w that he (1) has a "disability;" (2) is a "qualified individual;" and (3) has suffered an a d v e rs e employment action because of that disability. See Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F .3 d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d C ir . 1998)). To establish that he has a "disability," Robinson must show that: (1) he has a p h ys ic a l or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2 ) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he was "regarded as" having such an im p a irm e n t by Lockheed Martin. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pa.,
A.
U n d e r the first definition of "disability," Robinson must show that his im p a irm e n t significantly limits one or more major life activities. See id. at 361. Major lif e activities are those functions "such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, w a lk in g , seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Furthermore, a person is substantially limited in a major life activity when he is either: (1) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general p o p u la tio n can perform; or (2) significantly restricted as to the condition in which he can p e rf o rm a major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under w h ic h the average person in the general population can perform that same major life a c tiv ity. See id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). Only extremely limiting disabilities, either in the sh o rt-te rm or the long-term, qualify for protected status under the ADA. See Marinelli, 2 1 6 F.3d at 362.
In the complaint, Robinson asserted that his "seizure disorder" substantially lim its various major life activities, including traveling, eating and caring for himself.
More specifically, Robinson presented evidence that the following major life activities w e re substantially limited due to his "seizure disorder": (1) sporting activities, such as w a te r skiing, scuba diving and cycling; (2) cooking; (3) tub baths; (4) driving; (5) stress; (6 ) heights; and (7) social issues. Upon reviewing the record, we agree with the District C o u rt that Robinson fails to show a material issue of fact with respect to having a major lif e activity substantially limited due to his "seizure disorder." Regarding sporting activities, Robinson stated that his "seizure disorder" d id not stop him from engaging in the sports he frequently participated in (bicycle riding a n d scuba diving). Next, Robinson stated that his "seizure disorder" did not substantially c h a n g e his cooking habits. Before being diagnosed as having a "seizure disorder," R o b in so n would usually heat up frozen foods in the microwave or order fast food. His " se iz u re disorder" did not substantially limit this ability. Robinson's ability to bathe was a lso not substantially limited by his "seizure disorder" because he testified that his ability to shower was not affected.4 Additionally, with respect to any impairment the "seizure d iso rd e r" had on Robinson's ability to drive, we note that his license was reinstated in O c to b e r 2000. Furthermore, driving is not a major life activity. See Chenoweth v. H ills b o ro u g h County, 250 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Colwell v. S u f f o lk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998). Also, for the reasons s ta te d by the District Court, we agree that Robinson failed to show a material issue of fact o f having a disability based upon his doctor's advice that he avoid stress and heights. See T o yo ta Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002) (stating that a p lain tiff must show an inability to work in a broad range of jobs rather than just a specific jo b if the alleged major life activity substantially limited is working). Robinson presented n o evidence to show that "social issues" were substantially limited due to his "seizure d iso rd e r." Therefore, Robinson fails to create a material issue of fact with respect to this d e f in itio n of disability.
B.
A s previously noted, Robinson also argues that he has a disability because h e was "regarded as" having a disability by Lockheed Martin. In support of his argument th a t he was "regarded as" disabled, Robinson asserts three main points: (1) his s u p e rv is o rs at Lockheed Martin were aware of his "seizure disorder"; (2) he was p re v io u sly awarded short-term disability leave by Lockheed Martin when he suffered his f irs t seizure in March 2000; and (3) Murphy suggested that he apply for FMLA leave.5 " A person is `regarded as' having a disability if [he]: (1) has a physical or m e n ta l impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by th e covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others to w a rd such impairment; or (3) has [no such impairment] but is treated by a covered e n tity as having a substantially limiting impairment." See Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 2 9
T o prevail, Robinson must establish that Lockheed Martin believed he was limited in his ability to work in "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in v a rio u s classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and a b iliti e s ." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1 6 3 0 .2 (j)(3 )(i)). Therefore, "to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life a c tiv ity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job." See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999).
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Robinson, the evidence is insufficient to show that Lockheed Martin regarded him "as precluded from more than a particular job." See id. First, the parties dispute the amount of knowledge Robinson's s u p e rv is o rs had regarding his "seizure disorder." However, even when viewed in the lig h t most favorable to Robinson, this evidence does not create a material issue of fact th a t Robinson was "regarded as" having a disability due to his "seizure disorder." Indeed, " th e mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee's impairment is insufficient to d e m o n s tra te either that the employer regarded the employee as disabled or that that p e rc e p tio n caused the adverse employment action." See Kelly, 94 F.3d at 109. With re s p e c t to Robinson's second point, we note that he was allowed to return to the same p o s itio n by Lockheed Martin that he occupied before his four-week leave in April 2000.
Thus, it follows that this evidence does not create a material issue of fact such that L o c k h e ed Martin regarded Robinson "as precluded from more than a particular job." See M u rph y, 527 U.S. at 523. Finally, with respect to Robinson's third argument, Murphy's s ta te m e n t that Robinson should apply for FMLA leave does not create a material issue of f a c t that Robinson was "regarded as" significantly restricted his ability to work.6 See e.g., V in c e n t v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc. of Fla., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1405, 1420 (S.D. Fla.
1 9 9 8 ) (noting that "disability" under the ADA and "serious health condition" under the F M L A are different concepts that must be analyzed separately and that the leave portions o f the FMLA are distinct from the reasonable accommodations obligations under the A D A )(c itatio n s omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b). Thus, Robinson fails to create a material issue of fact that he was "regarded as" disabled by Lockheed Martin.
IV .
W e have considered all of the arguments and agree with the District Court th a t Robinson failed to create a material issue of fact regarding whether he established a p rim a facie case. Because Robinson did not establish a prima facie case, it is unnecessary to analyze the District Court's additional findings that Lockheed Martin stated a leg itim a te non-discriminatory reason for Robinson's dismissal and that Robinson failed to sh o w that his termination was pretextual. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's g ra n t of summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin.
3 Claims under the PHRA are similarly analyzed. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d
1 0 2 , 105 (3d Cir. 1996).
4 Robinson also testified that before his "seizure disorder" diagnosis, he would n o rm a lly take a tub bath two to three times a year.
5 Robinson did not assert a FMLA claim or a claim of retaliation for seeking FMLA le a v e.
6 The District Court found that Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130 (11th C ir . 1996), is distinguishable with respect to Robinson's claim that he was "regarded as" d isa b led by Lockheed Martin. We agree. First, as previously noted, Robinson returned to w o rk after his four-week leave in 2000 to the same job. Additionally, Robinson was not p la c e d on disability leave after Murphy suggested he apply for FMLA leave.
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This document cites
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - Jeffrey B. Newman v. Ghs Osteopathic, Inc., Parkview Hospital Division. Jeffrey B. Newman, Appellant., 60 F.3d 153 (3rd Cir. 1995)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - Marie Saldana, v. Kmart Corporation Marie Saldana, Appellant in No. 99-4055, 260 F.3d 228 (3rd Cir. 2001)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - Dennis E. Gaul, Appellant v. Lucent Technologies Inc. * ; John Does 1-100; Jane Does 1-100; Abc Corp.; Xyz Corp., 134 F.3d 576 (3rd Cir. 1998)
- US Code - Title 29: Labor - 29 USC 1 - Sec. 1. Design and duties of bureau generally
- Code of Federal Regulations - Title 29: Labor - 29 CFR 825.702 - Interaction with Federal and State anti-discrimination laws.
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