Liberty Res Inc v. SEPTA, (3rd Cir. 2002)
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-3702
LIBERTY RESOURCES, INC. and
CONSUMER CONNECTION
v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
Appellant
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 99-CV-4837)
District Judge: Honorable Lowell A. Reed, Jr., S.J.
Argued: December 9, 2002
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ROTH and SMITH
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 23, 2002)
BRADLEY K. MOSS (ARGUED)
Schnader Harrison
Segal & Lewis LLP
1600 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant
STEPHEN F. GOLD (ARGUED)
125 South Ninth Street
Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19107 THOMAS H. EARLE ROBIN RESNICK Disabilities Law Project 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107-4798 Counsel for Appellees OPINION BECKER, Chief Judge.
Defendant-appellant, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("Septa"), appealed to this Court from the Order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs Liberty Resources, Inc. and Consumer Connection (collectively "LRI") entered on January 8, 2001 and from the Order for Final Injunctive Relief entered on August 31, 2001. On June 3, 2002, after the notice of appeal was filed, the District Court entered an Order terminating the Order for Final Injunctive Relief, pursuant to the clause contained therein which stated that Septa may seek to have the injunction terminated after six consecutive months of compliance with the Order. Septa's appeal from the Order for Final Injunctive Relief is thus moot because it is no longer required to comply with the District Court's mandate. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1326 (3d Cir. 1995) ("As a general principle, once a party has complied with a court order or injunction, and has not been penalized or suffered any prejudice that could be remedied on appeal, the appeal is moot.").
We also conclude that the appeal from the January 8, 2001 Order granting summary judgment is moot. The doctrine of mootness requires a court to consider only those actions which "involve a live case or controversy [that] extends through all phases of litigation, including appellate review." County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001). The injunctive order is inextricably tied to the summary judgment order out of which it grew, and such conflation with the injunction moots the earlier order as well. Indeed, counsel for plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the District Court's opinion could not be used to preclude the litigation of issues in future litigation between the parties.
While a defendant's voluntary compliance will not render an action moot, in the case at bar, Septa's actions were not voluntary because it acted in response to the now terminated Order for Final Injunctive Relief. See Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 414 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The Supreme Court . . . on many occasions has held cases to be moot when the event causing mootness was compliance with a lower court injunction." citing DeFunis v. Odegaard,416 U.S. 312 (1974)).
We follow the "settled practice of vacating the district court judgment" when the issue is moot on appeal. Bagby, 606 F.2d at 414. See also United States v. Munsingwear,340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950) (holding that vacatur "is commonly used . . . to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences"). However, we will preserve LRI's right to collect attorney's fees. In Morris, this Court held that "an award of attorney's fees with respect to the trial phases of a case is not precluded when a case becomes moot during the pendency of an appeal." 273 F.3d at 534.
In conclusion, Septa's appeal will be dismissed as moot, and the matter will be remanded to the District Court with directions to vacate the judgment entered on January 8, 2001. Please file the foregoing Opinion.
BY THE COURT: 6
TO THE CLERK: /s/ Edward R. Becker Chief Judge
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This document cites
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - Martin Harris; Jesse Kithcart; William Davis; Randall Cummings; Evelyn Lingham; Estrus Fowler; Tyrone Hill; and Nathaniel Carter v. the City of Philadelphia; Joan Reeves, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Human Services of the City of Philadelphia; Albert F. Campbell; Rosita Saez-Achilla; Genece E. Brinkley, Esq., Rev. Paul M. Washington, M. Mark Mendel, Hon. Stanley Kubacki, Mamie Faines, Each in His or Her Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Philadelphia Prison System; J. Patrick Gallagher, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Philadelphia Prison System; Harry E. Moore, in His Official Capacity as Warden of Holmesburg Prison; Wilhelmina Speach, in Her Official Capacity as Warden of the Detention Center; Press Grooms, in His Official Capacity as Warden of the House of Corrections; Raymond E. Shipman, in His Official Capacity as Managing Director of the City of Philadelphia; and Mayor Edward G. Rendell, in His Official Capa...
- U.S. Supreme Court - DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (per curiam) (1974)
- U.S. Supreme Court - United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - Elizabeth v. Bagby v. Frank S. Beal, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Secy. of the Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare, Et Al., Donald E. Downs and Thomas F. Brubaker, Appellants., 606 F.2d 411 (3rd Cir. 1979)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - County of Morris, v. Nationalist Movement, Appellant, 273 F.3d 527 (3rd Cir. 2001)
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