Karamjit Singh, et al. v. Gonzales, (2nd Cir. 2007)

Text

---

06-3686

K a r a m j i t Singh, et al. v. Gonzales

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

R U L I N G S BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED

A F T E R JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 0.23 AND

F E D E R A L RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT

C I T E S A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION

M U S T EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION: "(SUMMARY ORDER)."

U N L E S S THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE

W I T H O U T PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV), THE

P A R T Y CITING THE SUMMARY ORDER MUST FILE AND SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER

W I T H THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED. IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE

A V A I L A B I L I T Y OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT

D A T A B A S E AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.

A t a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

f o r the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

U n i t e d States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

N e w York, on the 23rd day of April, two thousand seven.

PRESENT:

H O N . JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

H O N . CHESTER J. STRAUB,

H O N . RICHARD C. WESLEY,

C i r c u i t Judges.

K A R A M J I T SINGH, JAGJEET SINGH, GURPREET

M . SINGH, HARPREET SINGH, SURINDER KAUR,

Petitioners,

06-3686-ag

v. NAC

A L B E R T O R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

F O R PETITIONERS: H e c t o r M. Roman, Jackson Heights,

N e w York.

F O R RESPONDENT: P e t e r D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney G e n e r a l , Michelle Gorden Latour, A s s i s t a n t Director, R. Alexander G o r i n g , Trial Attorney, Washington, DC.

U P O N DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a d e c i s i o n of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), it is h e r e b y ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for r e v i e w is DENIED.

K a r a m j i t Singh, Surinder Kaur, Jagjeet Singh, Gurpreet M . Singh, and Harpreet Singh, natives and citizens of India, s e e k review of a July 17, 2006, order of the BIA denying t h e i r motion to reopen removal proceedings. In re Karamjit S i n g h / S u r i n d e r Kaur/Jagjeet Singh/Gurpreet M. Singh/Harpreet S i n g h , Nos. A75 980 362/405/406/407/408 (B.I.A. July 17, 2006). We assume the parties' familiarity with the u n d e r l y i n g facts and procedural history of the case.

W h e n the BIA denies a motion to reopen, we review the B I A ' s decision for an abuse of discretion. Twum v. INS, 411 F . 3 d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2005). An abuse of discretion may be f o u n d where the BIA's decision "provides no rational e x p l a n a t i o n , inexplicably departs from established policies, i s devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or c o n c l u s o r y statements; that is to say, where the Board has a c t e d in an arbitrary or capricious manner." Ke Zhen Zhao v . U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) ( i n t e r n a l citations omitted). Where, as here, an individual f i l e s a timely petition from the denial of a motion to r e o p e n , but did not file a timely appeal disputing the BIA's o r i g i n a l affirmance of the IJ's credibility ruling, we " c o n f i n e our review to the denial of petitioner's motion to r e o p e n [the] proceedings" and we do not review the validity o f the original credibility determination. Paul v. G o n z a l e s , 444 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal c i t a t i o n s and quotation marks omitted).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying p e t i t i o n e r s ' second motion to reopen. First, the articles t h a t Singh submitted to assert changed country circumstances d i d not show material changes as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Rather, they reported generally about the e x c e s s e s and impunity of the police in Punjab and did not a d d r e s s the particular claims of Singh and his family, who l i v e d in Delhi. While the articles discuss some instances o f police violence in Punjab, they do not show that the p o l i c e outside Punjab targeted Sikhs like Singh because of t h e i r political activities.

S e c o n d , in light of the IJ's adverse credibility f i n d i n g ­ which Singh failed to challenge properly in a p e t i t i o n for review ­ it was not an abuse of discretion for t h e BIA to give little, if any, weight to the death c e r t i f i c a t e s and affidavit that Singh submitted alleging a c o n t i n u i n g fear of persecution by the Indian government. The B I A properly concluded that Singh's claim that the police c o n t i n u e d to target him did not have an independent basis f o r establishing a well-founded fear, but instead rested on h i s past political activity, which is the same factual p r e d i c a t e that the IJ found not to be credible. Therefore, t h e adverse credibility finding in his underlying case p r e c l u d e s , in part, Singh's success on his motion to reopen.

S e e Paul, 444 F.3d at 154.

F o r the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Having completed our review, petitioners' pending m o t i o n for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED a s moot.

F O R THE COURT: T h o m a s Asreen, Acting Clerk By:

---