Hull v. City of Santa Fe, (10th Cir. 2006)

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UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

GRETCHEN LYNN HULL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.



CITY OF SANTA FE,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 06-2061

(D. Ct. No. CIV-05-1003 WPL/RLP)

(D. N. Mex.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
name="txt*">(*)

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge,
name="10">HARTZ, and TYMKOVICH,

Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

The

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This appeal involves the third incarnation of what originated as a negligence

action filed against the City of Santa Fe. Plaintiff-Appellant Gretchen Hull claimed in a

state court lawsuit that she tripped and fell on a sidewalk in Santa Fe and that the city

was liable for improper maintenance of the sidewalk. The state court judge entered

judgment against Ms. Hull following a bench trial. She unsuccessfully appealed that

decision to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, see Hull v. Feinstein, 65 P.3d 266

(N.M.

Ct. App. 2002), cert denied, 65 P.3d 1094 (N.M. 2003).

Ms. Hull then filed suit in federal district court against the City of Santa Fe under

42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the state court violated her due process rights in

adjudicating her negligence action against the city. The district court granted the city's

motion to dismiss. A panel of this Court affirmed, holding that the City of Santa Fe

cannot be held liable for the conduct of the state court system, and that even if Ms. Hull

had sued the proper defendant, the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over the

claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Hull v. City of Santa Fe,

113 F. App'x

301, 302 (10th Cir. 2004) cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005); see also Merrill

Lynch Bus.

Fin. Servs. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1074­75 (2004) (federal courts, other than the

Supreme Court, do not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions).

Subsequently, Ms. Hull filed another § 1983 action in which she again

alleged

constitutional violations in her state court negligence action. Relying on the panel's

decision in Hull, the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Ms. Hull did not appeal that ruling. On September 19, 2005, Ms. Hull filed

the instant action, a third § 1983 action, alleging due process and equal protection

violations by the state court in her negligence action. Again, the District Court dismissed

the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It also entered an order barring Ms. Hull

from filing future claims against the City of Santa Fe involving the same subject matter

as the instant case. Ms. Hull, appearing pro se, timely appealed. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and we AFFIRM.

As an initial matter, we hold, as we did before, see Hull, 113 F. App'x at 302,

that

the City of Santa Fe cannot be held liable for the conduct of the state court system, and

that even if Ms. Hull had sued the proper defendant, this Court would lack subject matter

jurisdiction over the claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Merrill

Lynch, 363

F.3d at 1074­75.

With regard to the District Court's order prohibiting Ms. Hull from continuing to

file the same action against the City of Santa Fe, we review such decisions for an abuse

of discretion. See Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 1989). Federal

courts

have discretion to impose "carefully tailored restrictions" on the activities of abusive

litigants under appropriate circumstances. Id. at 352. So long as a litigant is

provided

notice and an opportunity to oppose the court's order prior to it being instituted,

injunctions against future filings may be "proper where the litigant's abusive and lengthy

history is properly set forth." Id. at 353. Here, the filing restriction was carefully

tailored

to fit the specific abuse and the District Court provided Ms. Hull with notice and an

opportunity to respond to the proposed restriction prior to entering its order. We

conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in barring Ms. Hull from

filing further proceedings in federal court in this matter.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT,

Deanell Reece Tacha

Chief Circuit Judge

FOOTNOTES

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*.This order and judgment is not binding

precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

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