Gray v. Addision, (10th Cir. 2004)

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT





FREDERICK GRAY,

Petitioner-Appellant,





v.

No. 03-6270

MIKE ADDISON, Warden; and the

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

Respondents-Appellees.

(D.C. No. CIV-00-562-L)

(W.D. Okla.)





ORDER AND JUDGMENT
name="txt*">(*)



Before BRISCOE,
name="9">BALDOCK, and
name="10">TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
name="txt2">(2)



Petitioner Frederick Gray shot his girlfriend. He claimed at trial the shooting was

an accident. An Oklahoma jury disagreed and convicted Petitioner of first degree

murder. See 21 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 701.7(A). The state trial court sentenced

Petitioner to

life imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, raising nine claims of error.
name="txt1a">(1) The Oklahoma

Court of Criminal Appeals summarily affirmed and denied Petitioner's request for

rehearing.

Petitioner never sought any relief under the Oklahoma Post-Conviction

Procedure

Act. See 22 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 1080-1089. Instead, Petitioner filed an

application for a

writ of habeas corpus in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner asserted ten

grounds for relief in his habeas petition: the first nine claims he raised on direct appeal

in state court, see supra n.1, and an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claim. The

district court subsequently permitted Petitioner to amend his habeas petition to include a

claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue an

insanity defense. Petitioner admitted neither ineffective assistance claim was raised in

state court.

Petitioner's amended habeas petition therefore included exhausted and

unexhausted claims. A magistrate judge recommended that "[Petitioner] not be required

to return to state court to exhaust [his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim]

because the Oklahoma courts would find the claim procedurally barred." The magistrate

judge thereafter recommended denying the writ on the merits of both Petitioner's

exhausted and unexhausted claims. The district court, after holding an evidentiary

hearing on Petitioner's unexhausted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim and

supplementing the magistrate judge's analysis, adopted the recommendation. The court

subsequently granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability on the limited issue of

whether Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial

counsel. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 2253, proceed directly to the merits of

Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, and affirm.
name="txt2a">(2)

Petitioner asks us to determine whether his trial counsel's "failures prejudiced

[him] by depriving the jury of essential, material evidence on the critical element of

intent [to commit murder]." Petitioner, however, has not carried his burden of

designating a record sufficient for us to answer that question. See 10th Cir. R. 10.3(A).

The record on appeal in this case consists of (1) the original, amended, and second

amended habeas petition, (2) the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, (3)

Petitioner's motion to appoint a guardian ad litem and/or counsel, (4) the district court's

order adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation, (5) the final judgment,

(6) Petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability, (7) Petitioner's notice of

appeal, and (8) the transcripts of the evidentiary hearing. Notably absent from the record

is the state trial transcripts and other documents cited in the briefs. See 10th Cir. R.

10.1(A)(1) ("The appellant must provide all portions of the transcript necessary to give

the court a complete and accurate record of the proceedings related to the issues on

appeal."). Both parties assert the evidence presented at trial does not support the other's

version of the shooting. We have no way of knowing who is correct. Furthermore, we

cannot determine if the jury was deprived of "essential, material evidence" on the issue

of Petitioner's intent to commit murder when we do not know what, if any, evidence was

presented at trial on the issue of intent.

We need not remedy Petitioner's failure to designate an adequate record. See

10th

Cir. R. 10.3(B). Instead, we must affirm where the evidentiary record is insufficient to

permit review of Petitioner's claims. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 912 (10th Cir. 2000).

Because we cannot meaningfully engage in the analysis required under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) on the record Petitioner submitted, the district court's

final judgment denying Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus is

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court,

Bobby R. Baldock

Circuit Judge

FOOTNOTES

Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. This order and judgment is not binding

precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

2. After examining the briefs and appellate

record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case therefore is

ordered

submitted without oral argument.

1. Petitioner specifically argued: (1) the state

trial court erred in admitting human

silhouette targets, other crime evidence, and a protective order; (2) the state trial court

erred in admitting letters he wrote to the victim; (3) insufficient evidence existed to

support his first degree murder conviction; (4) the State violated his right to pretrial

notice of various evidence; (5) the state trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on

excusable homicide; (6) the state trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on lesser

included offenses; (7) the state trial court erred in permitting him to stand before the jury

and reenact the events surrounding the shooting; (8) the state trial court erred in

admitting a photograph; and (9) the state trial court's cumulative errors deprived him of a

fair trial.

2. Respondents never argued in the district

court or on appeal that Petitioner's

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was unexhausted or procedurally barred. We

perceive, given the ultimate disposition of this case, no reason to raise sua sponte

either

exhaustion or procedural bar. See Gonzales v. McKune, 279 F.3d 922, 926

(10th Cir.

2002).

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