George Johnson v. Board of Trustees, (11th Cir. 2006)
Linked as:
Text
[D O NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U .S . COURT OF APPEALS
E L E V E N T H CIRCUIT
N o . 05-12501
J u n e 30, 2006
T H O M A S K. KAHN
CLERK
D . C. Docket No. 02-02896-CV-UWC-S
G E O R G E JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA,
BROOKS BAKER, in his official
and in his individual personal
capacity,
WILLIAM A. COPE, in his official
and in his individual personal
capacity,
JOHN COOK, in his official and
in his individual personal capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
A p p e al from the United States District Court
fo r the Northern District of Alabama
(J u n e 30, 2006)
B efo re EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, and M I D D L E B R O O K S *, District Judge.
K R A V I T C H , Circuit Judge: In this employment discrimination action, appellant George Johnson appeals th e district court's grant of the summary judgment motion of the appellees, the B o a r d of Trustees of the University of Alabama, Brooks Baker, William A. Cope, an d John Cook, on Johnson's retaliation claim and the district court's grant of ap p ellees' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on Johnson's disparate tr ea tm e n t and disparate impact claims. After oral argument and a thorough review o f the record, we affirm the judgments of the district court.
I.
G eo rg e Johnson, an African-American, began working at the University of A lab am a at Birmingham ("UAB") in 1981 as a messenger. Johnson applied for an d received promotions to new jobs several times during the 1980s.
In January 1988, a class action complaint was filed against UAB alleging th a t black employees in the Facilities Management Department had been d iscrim in ated against on the basis of race in promotion and other terms and c o n d itio n s of employment. This action, known as the Woods litigation, ended in N o v em b er 1990 when the parties negotiated a Consent Decree, signed by the same d istrict judge who presided in this case, Judge Clemon. The Decree was set to ex p ire in three years. As a result of the decree, Johnson got a job as a Central Plant R e p a ir er . Although the Decree did not expire in three years, the district court f o u n d that UAB had substantially complied with the Decree by 1995, and it was d ism issed in 1999.
I n 1991, Johnson applied for a promotion to Central Plant Operator and was d en ied . He then filed an EEOC claim, a separate lawsuit, and a motion to show c au s e . Brooks Baker, currently Associate Vice President for Facilities and then E x ecu tiv e Director of Facilities Management, testified against Johnson at the show c au s e hearing. The Decree provided that UAB's internal promotion procedure was to be used for the purpose of promoting "incumbent employees who satisfy the m in im u m qualifications defined in the job description for a vacant position or are o th erw ise qualified." The court found that UAB violated the Decree by not co n sid erin g whether Johnson was "otherwise qualified," even though he did not m eet the minimum standards. The court awarded Johnson the position and b ack p ay.
In 1998, Johnson applied for and was promoted to Materials Control S p ecialist. The requirements listed in the job description included a minimum of 4 ,0 0 0 hours of verifiable on-the-job training for the classification or equivalent v erifiab le experience. Johnson did not have the required on-the-job training, but th e Energy Systems Director, William Odom, declared him "otherwise qualified" b ased on his work in UAB's supply room and training received at Office Depot.
O n or about October 30, 2000, Johnson applied for the Materials P ro cu rem en t Specialist/Expediter ("MPSE") position, which is the position at issue in this case. The job was posted internally on October 25, 2000, and Johnson a p p lie d along with three other internal candidates, a white male, a Hispanic male, an d a black male. The job position listed the requirements as follows: E d u c atio n : An accredited four (4) year bachelor degree in business or related field . Three (3) years verifiable experience in material procurement or ex p ed itin g may be substituted for two (2) years of college.
Experience: A minimum of three (3) years experience in material p r o c u r e m e n t and expediting maintenance and construction materials at sim ilar facilities.
Personal: Possess a Driver's License valid in the State of Alabama.
N O T E : BEST QUALIFIED APPLICANT WILL BE CHOSEN.
T h e internal applications went directly to the Human Relations Department w h ere they initially were reviewed by Allen Kennedy. On November 7, 2000, K en n ed y determined that none of the internal applicants met the educational and/or e x p e r ie n c e requirements and forwarded the application packets to the Facilities M an ag em en t Department for further review pursuant to department policy. Hope H am m o n d s, Director of Design Build Services, reviewed the applications, and alo n g with John Cook and Willie Smith, interviewed the four internal applicants in late November. Each applicant was asked the same questions and Johnson receiv ed a score of 9.5/18.
Regarding the educational requirement, Johnson attended Kentucky State U n iv ersity from fall 1976 to spring 1981 and earned 92 hours (which Johnson claim s was equal to three years) toward a Sociology degree. The only b u sin ess-related course he took was a principles of economics class, in which he receiv ed a "D." Regarding the experience requirement, he was credited with two y ea rs and ten months of experience.
O n May 21, 2001, Hammonds sent a memo to Janet Cunningham, the D iv isio n al Personnel Officer, with a brief analysis of each internal applicant and n o ted that none of the applicants met the minimum requirements described in the jo b description. William Cope then reviewed Hammonds's memo and made the d ecisio n to conduct an external search to fill the vacancy.
O n April 26, 2001, Ronald Barnes, an African-American, applied for the p o s itio n and ultimately was awarded the job. Barnes had a bachelor of science d eg ree and an MBA degree from UAB and had over twenty-two years of ex p erien ce in materials procurement.
O n November 8, 2001, Cook notified Johnson that he did not get the job in a letter that stated: "After careful review, it was determined that you do not meet the q u a lif ic atio n s , per the attached job description, nor were you otherwise qualified." The letter was drafted by Hammonds and signed by Cook.
Jo h n so n then filed this suit against the Board of Trustees of the University of A lab am a, Brooks Baker, William Cope, and John Cook, alleging a violation of T itle VII and 42U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for race discrimination in promotion and term s and conditions of employment and retaliation. Both parties filed motions for s u m m a ry judgment. The district court found that the Board of Trustees was en titled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment for the § 1983 c la im s , but found that Baker, Cope, and Cook were not entitled to qualified im m u n ity and denied their motion for summary judgment for the § 1983 claims.
The court also denied the cross-motions for summary judgment on Johnson's d isp arate impact and disparate treatment claims under Title VII and granted the ap p ellees' motion for summary judgment on Johnson's retaliation claim. In its b rief order, the court did not provide any reasons for its decisions. T h e case proceeded to a jury trial on the disparate treatment claim and a b en ch trial on the disparate impact claim. At the close of Johnson's evidence, the d istrict court granted the appellees' Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on those remaining claims. The district court explained that Johnson failed to p r o v e a prima facie case for disparate treatment, and even if he had, the appellees p r o f f er ed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and Johnson could not show that it was pretext for racial discrimination. With respect to the disparate impact claim, th e district court held that the "Defendant has carried its burden of proof that it w o u ld have made the same decision on Plaintiff's disparate impact claim." Johnson then timely filed this appeal.
II.
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2004). We view the evidence an d make all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Id.
W e review de novo the district court's grant of a motion for judgment as a m atter of law, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Bianchi v. R o a d w a y Express, Inc., 441 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2006). I II .
A.
A s an initial matter, Johnson argues that this court should remand or reverse b e c au s e the district court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law when it granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim. Although it would have b een preferable to have the district court's reasoning before us, especially in a case lik e this involving shifting burdens, in this case it is not fatal. Findings of fact and co n clu sio n s of law are not required for motions for summary judgment or for the en try of judgment as a matter of law in a jury trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see J a c ks o n v. State of Ala. State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ), and the record here is sufficient for us to proceed.
B.
Jo h n so n argues that the district court erred in granting the appellees' motion fo r summary judgment on Johnson's retaliation claim, which stemmed from the claim s he filed in 1992 when he was denied a promotion to Central Plant Operator.
Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because the em p lo yee "has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3. "In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a p lain tiff must prove the following elements: (1) [he] participated in an activity p ro tected by Title VII; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) th ere is a causal connection between the participation in the protected activity and th e adverse employment decision." Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 5 8 7 (11th Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the employer to articu late a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.
Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001). If the d efen d an t succeeds, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show by a p rep o n d eran ce of the evidence that the defendant's proffered reason was pretext fo r discrimination. Id.
W e conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment b e c au s e Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case. Specifically, Johnson failed to show that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the ad v erse employment decision where nine years had passed between the time Jo h n so n filed his EEOC claim, lawsuit, and motion to show cause in 1992, and the d en ial of promotion in 2001. Moreover, Johnson received a promotion to M aterials Control Specialist in 1998.
C.
Jo h n so n next argues that the district court erred in granting the appellees' R u le 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on his disparate treatment claim.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual w ith respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, b ecau se of such individual's race." 42U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1). In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in the failure-to-promote context, a p lain tiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and w as qualified for the promotion; (3) he was rejected in spite of his qualifications; a n d (4) the employer promoted an individual outside of the plaintiff's protected class, or else continued to attempt to fill the position. Walker v. Mortham, 158 F .3 d 1177, 1193 (11th Cir. 1998); Crawford v. W. Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5 th Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Sephora, Div. of DFS Group L.P., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1 2 1 4 , 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2002). "[I]f the plaintiff successfully demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence that its a ctio n was taken for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason." Brooks v. County C o m m 'n of Jefferson County, 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). If the d e f en d a n t is successful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must show that th e employer's proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. Id. We conclude th a t the district court properly granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law b ecau se Johnson did not carry his burden in proving a prima facie case, nor did he su cceed in showing pretext.
D.
Johnson then argues that the district court erred in granting the appellees' R u le 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on his disparate impact claim when it found that the appellees carried their burden of proof that they would have made th e same employment decision. Disparate impact claims brought pursuant to Title V II seek to show that facially neutral employment practices have significant a d v e r se effects on protected groups, even in the absence of proof that the practice w as adopted with discriminatory intent. To establish a prima facie case of d is p a ra te impact, a plaintiff must show that "(1) there is a significant statistical d isp arity among members of different racial groups; (2) there is a specific, faciallyn eu tral employment policy or practice; and (3) there is a causal nexus between the s p e cif ic policy or practice and the statistical disparity." Cooper v. S. Co.,
Even if the court ultimately finds that the employer has violated the d is p a ra te impact provisions of Title VII, the plaintiff still must prove individual h arm : "[I]f an individual plaintiff has shown that he or she was within the class of p erso n s negatively impacted by the unlawful employment practice, then the em p lo yer must be given an opportunity to demonstrate a legitimate n o n d is cr im in a to r y reason why, absent the offending practice, the individual p la in tif f would not have been awarded the job or job benefit at issue anyway." In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against the State of Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1 3 1 5 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Stephen v. PGA Sheraton Resort, Ltd.,
F o r the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district court.
A F F IR M E D .
* Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
1 In so holding, we express no opinion on whether Johnson established a prima facie case or whether, if he did, the appellees proved that the education requirement was justified as a business necessity.
Sponsored links
This document cites
- US Code - Title 42: The Public Health and Welfare - 42 USC 1981 - Sec. 1981. Equal rights under the law
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - Michelle Spivey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., D.B.A. Boaz Health & Rehabilitation Center, Defendant-Appellee., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - in Re: Employment Discrimination Litigation Against the State of Alabama, Et Al., Eugene Crum, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Individuals, Robert L. Smith, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. State of Alabama, Halycon Vance Ballard, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Director, Alabama Department of Personnel, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants, United States of America, Intervenor., 198 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - Srabana Gupta, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Florida Board of Regents, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants., 212 F.3d 571 (11th Cir. 2000)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe'S Stone Crab, Inc., Defendant-Appellee., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000)
See other documents that cite the same legislation
