Edward C. Gibson v. Cleophus Gains, Jr., (11th Cir. 2006)

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[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APR 4, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 05-15997

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 04-00910-CV-T-S

E D W A R D C. GIBSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CLEOPHUS GAINS, JR.,

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Tax Division,

BILL THOMPSON,

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Defendants-Appellees.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Middle District of Alabama

(A p ril 4, 2006)

B efo re MARCUS, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM: E d w ard Gibson, a pro se litigant, appeals the district court's dismissal of his c iv il rights complaint. We affirm the district court's decision for the reasons set fo rth below.

I.

G ib so n filed a pro se civil rights complaint against Alabama Department of R ev en u e Assistant Counsel Cleophus Gaines, Jr.,1 and Alabama Department of R ev en u e Chief Administrative Law Judge Bill Thompson (collectively, the "in d iv id u al defendants"), and the State of Alabama and the Alabama Department o f Revenue (collectively, the "State"). Under a liberal construction of his co m p lain t, Gibson alleged federal constitutional and statutory violations pursuant to 42U.S.C. § 1983, a conspiracy claim pursuant to 42U.S.C. § 1985, as well as state law claims of selective prosecution, obstruction of justice, invasion of p riv acy, libel, and various criminal violations. Gibson's complaint arose from his c la im s that the state was improperly collecting taxes that he did not owe and was h a r as sin g and intimidating him in order to obtain payment. Gibson requested in ju n ctiv e relief, damages in excess of $100 million, and a protective order to p rev en t the state from filing a lien for non-payment of taxes. C o u n sel for the defendants construed the complaint to name only Gaines and T h o m p so n as defendants in their official and individual capacities and moved to d ism iss, arguing that, inter alia, the claims against the individual defendants in th eir official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and in their in d iv id u a l capacities by qualified immunity, and the court lacked jurisdiction under th e Tax Injunction Act, 29U.S.C. § 1341, and in the interests of comity because th ere was an adequate state remedy available.

Gibson responded to the motion to dismiss, reiterating his claims and arg u in g that he did not have an adequate state remedy. He also moved for default ju d g m en t against the State, which the court denied, and for summary judgment.

T h e magistrate judge ultimately recommended granting the motion to d ism iss, noting that Gibson apparently intended to name as defendants both the in d iv id u als and the State. The magistrate first found that the Eleventh Amendment p rev en ted the court from exercising jurisdiction over the claims against the State an d the individual defendants in their official capacities, except to the extent G ib so n sought injunctive relief on his federal claims. The magistrate judge next fo u n d that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims under the T ax Injunction Act because there was an adequate state remedy, and that, in the in te re sts of comity, the court should not consider the claims for monetary damages ag ain st the individual defendants in their individual capacities nor should it c o n s id e r the § 1985(3) conspiracy claims. Finally, the magistrate judge concluded th at criminal statutes did not provide a private right of action that would enable G ib s o n to bring a criminal complaint for deprivations of his rights. The district co u rt then adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations over Gibson's o b jectio n s and dismissed the complaint. Gibson now appeals.

I I.

W e review the denial of a motion for default judgment for abuse of d iscretio n . Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (1 1 th Cir. 2002). Questions of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.

Samco Global Arms, Inc. v. Arita, 395 F.3d 1212, 1214 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005). We rev iew a district court's decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction o v er state law claims for abuse of discretion. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1 0 8 6 , 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004).

A s an initial matter, the appellees argue that Gibson has waived the issues on ap p eal by not presenting any specific arguments for how the district court was in erro r. See, e.g., Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1242 n.10 (11th Cir. 2003). The p etitio n s of pro se litigants, however, are to be construed liberally. Haines v. K e rn e r, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In light of this, Gibson argued that the court erred by dismissing his complaint, and therefore this court will address the merits.

A. Default Judgment U n d e r the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, entry of default is proper "[ w ]h e n a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided in these rules." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions for default ju d g m en t because the defendants' motion to dismiss qualified as a responsive p lead in g , and therefore, a default judgment was not warranted.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction T h e Tax Injunction Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, s u s p e n d or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law w h e r e a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28U.S.C. § 1341. This limitation is jurisdictional, and this circuit has held that "`th e Tax Injunction Act will bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction if two co n d itio n s are met: (1) the relief requested by the plaintiff will "enjoin, suspend, or restrain " a state tax assessment and (2) the state affords the plaintiff a "plain, s p e ed y and efficient remedy."'" Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F .3 d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Williams v. City of Dothan, 745 F.2d 1 4 0 6 , 1411 (11th Cir. 1984)). Here, Gibson has satisfied the first element because h e is challenging the State's determination that he owes back taxes, thus the q u estio n for the court is whether the state has satisfied the second prong.

T h e Supreme Court has held that "the `plain, speedy and efficient' exception r eq u ir es the state-court remedy [to meet] certain procedural criteria." California v. G r a c e Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411 (1982) (internal quotation omitted) (alteratio n in original). "The touchstone . . . is whether [the taxpayer] is entitled to a full hearing and judicial determination at which she may raise any and all c o n s titu tio n a l objections to the tax." Amos, 347 F.3d at 1256 (internal quotation o m itted ). The plaintiff has the burden to show facts sufficient to overcome the ju risd ictio n al bar of the Tax Injunction Act. Smith v. Travis County Educ. Dist., 9 6 8 F.2d 453, 456 (11th Cir. 1992).

A cco rd in g to the State, Gibson challenged the State's determination of his tax liability, the Administrative Law Division of the Department of Revenue a ff ir m e d after a hearing, which Gibson failed to attend, and Gibson did not appeal th a t decision as permitted by Alabama law. Gibson does not argue, and has failed to show, that the state remedy was not "plain, speedy and efficient." The district co u rt, therefore, correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Gibson's claim s against the State and the individual defendants in their individual and o fficial capacities to the extent that Gibson was seeking a declaratory judgment or in ju n ctiv e relief preventing the defendants from collecting the assessed taxes.

A d d itio n a lly , because "[t]he recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a `declaration' or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state ta x scheme that would halt its operation," the Supreme Court has held that "tax p ayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions ag ain st the validity of state tax systems in federal courts," provided that "plain, a d e q u a te , and complete" state remedies are available.2 Fair Assessment in Real E sta te Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 115, 116 (1981). Again, because G ib so n failed to argue that there was not a "plain, adequate, and complete" state rem ed y, to the extent that he seeks monetary damages against the defendants p u r su a n t to 42U.S.C. § 1983, the district court correctly concluded that principles o f comity preclude it from entertaining the claims. The same reasoning also ex ten d s to Gibson's claim for damages under 42U.S.C. § 1985 because the claim d e p e n d s on an initial determination of the constitutionality of the state tax system an d therefore the district court correctly declined to entertain that claim as well.

C . Criminal Prosecution "[A ] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution o r nonprosecution of another." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1 9 7 3 ). Therefore, to the extent that Gibson raises criminal allegations against the d e f en d a n ts , Gibson lacks standing to raise such claims and the district court p ro p erly dismissed them.

D . State Law Claims T h e district court can decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when "th e district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28U.S.C. § 1367(c). This circuit has "encouraged district courts to dismiss any rem ain in g state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, th e district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental ju r is d ic tio n over Gibson's state law claims once it determined that it lacked ju risd ictio n to entertain Gibson's federal law claims.

A cco rd in g ly, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of this action.

A F F IR M E D .

1 Gibson has apparently misspelled this party's name. The court will use the spelling used by Gaines's attorney.

2 The Supreme Court found "no significant difference" between the "plain, adequate, and complete" standard used for comity and the "plain, speedy and efficient" standard used in § 1341. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 n.8 (1981).

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