Dept. of Environment v. Eugene Pfeifer, (8th Cir. 2004)
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United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 03-3151/3264
Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Eugene Pfeifer, doing business as One Source Home and Building Centers, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Submitted: August 11, 2004 Filed: August 19, 2004
Before SMITH, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) appeals the district court§§ 6991, 6991b. Eugene Pfeifer, doing business as One Source Home and Building Centers (One Source), cross-appeals the district courtÂ’s denial of attorneyÂ’s fees. We affirm.
District of Arkansas.
ADEQ§ 6991b(h)(6)(A) and Ark. Code Ann. § 8-7-807(b) recovery of funds expended on response and corrective actions in connection with the release of petroleum from underground storage tanks (USTs) formerly located on property owned by Pfeifer, and a declaratory judgment holding Pfeifer liable for the cost of future response and corrective actions in connection with such release.
Pfeifer moved for summary judgment and attorneyÂ’s fees. The district court granted summary judgment, finding as relevant Pfeifer was never the owner of the USTs. The court, however, denied Pfeifer attorneyÂ’s fees because ADEQÂ’s case "was not totally unsupported."
I. Summary Judgment
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Meyers v. Neb. Health and Human Servs., 324 F.3d 655, 658-59 (8th Cir. 2003). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment must be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." However, the nonmoving party "‘must present more than a scintilla of evidence and must advance specific facts to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.’" See Meyers, 324 F.3d at 659 (quoted case omitted).
Under RCRA, the term "owner," in the case of a UST "in use on November 8, 1984, or brought into use after that date," means "any person who owns [a UST] used for the storage, use, or dispensing of regulated sustances [sic]." See 42 U.S.C. § 6991(3)(A). We find the evidence shows Pfeifer was not the owner of the USTs before they were removed by Pollution Management, Inc. (PMI). While One Source was designated as owner in various documents filed with ADEQ, apparently all prepared by PMI, these documents predate PfeiferÂ’s purchase of the land on which the USTs were located. Further, there is no indication Pfeifer intended to make use
Appeals from the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
[UNPUBLISHED]
adverse grant of summary judgment in ADEQÂ’s action under the
The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern
of the USTs other than to remove them from the land, as is evidenced by PfeiferÂ’s execution of the warranty deed only after PMI had completed their removal. These circumstances support PfeiferÂ’s uncontroverted attestation he conditioned purchase of the land on removal of the USTs, and evidence Pfeifer sought a cost estimate from PMI regarding their removal is consistent with this conclusion. Thus, while Pfeifer surely was interested in making certain the USTs were properly removed, a reasonable trier of fact could not find Pfeifer was an "owner" of the USTs as defined by section 6691(3)(A). See Herring v. Can. Life Assurance Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (dispute is not "genuine" unless evidence is such that reasonable trier of fact could return verdict for nonmovant).
II. AttorneyÂ’s Fees
We review for abuse of discretion a district courtÂ’s denial of a motion for attorneyÂ’s fees. See Gelco Corp. v. Baker Indus., Inc., 779 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The district court may award attorneyÂ’s fees to a litigant if the other party acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." See Hoover v. Armco, Inc., 915 F.2d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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This document cites
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - Eugene Herring Plaintiff - Appellee, v. the Canada Life Assurance Company Defendant - Appellant., 207 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2000)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - Vicky Meyers, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nebraska Health and Human Services; Joyce Starke, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; Kathy Carter, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; and Darren Duncan, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Defendant - Appellee., 324 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2003)
- US Code - Title 42: The Public Health and Welfare - 42 USC 6991 - Sec. 6991. Definitions and exemptions
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - Gelco Corporation, a Minnesota Corporation, Appellant, v. Baker Industries, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Appellee. Gelco Corporation, Appellee, v. Baker Industries, Inc., Appellant., 779 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1985)
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - Robert E. Hoover, Appellant, v. Armco, Inc., and Armco Inc. Noncontributory Pension Plan, Appellees. Robert E. Hoover, Appellee, v. Armco, Inc., and Armco Inc. Noncontributory Pension Plan, Appellants., 915 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1990)
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