Daly, et al v. Raytheon Company, (1st Cir. 2001)

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[NOT FOR PUBLICATION-NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-1473

RICHARD H. DALY; R. G. GRIFFITH; ROBERT A. LAWSON;

RICHARD M. LANGLEY; WILLIAM ANDREW; FRANK H. WILDER;

JOSEPH E. MCNULTY; ENNIS TISDALE; WILLIAM CHIGNOLA;

ROSS OFRIA; ROBERT C. SNOW; D. H. ALESSANDRINI;

E. W. HENDERSON; RUSSELL B. MASON; FRANCIS J. DEMIGLIO;

LOUIS ROSI; ROBERT A. VEDUCCIO; STEVEN CACI;

STANLEY F. JOHNSON; JOHN BIGELOW; PHILLIP L. WARREN;

JEROME ELLNER; BARRY FORSYTHE; LINWOOD CLAY; JOSEPH A.

BILOTTA,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

RAYTHEON COMPANY,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

Thomas R. Mason for appellants.

Brian D. Carlson, with whom Thomas E. Shirley and Choate,

Hall & Stewart, were on brief, for appellee.

February 28, 2001

Per curiam. On May 1, 1991, plaintiffs-appellants, a

group of former employees of defendant-appellee Raytheon Company

("Raytheon"), accepted layoffs pursuant to a voluntary layoff

program ("the 1991 Plan"). The 1991 Plan was not covered by the

Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). In

April 1992, Raytheon implemented a second early retirement plan

("the 1992 Plan"), which was an ERISA plan. The 1992 Plan

provided more favorable benefits than the 1991 Plan.

On January 2, 1998, plaintiffs brought a state court

action against Raytheon for breach of contract, alleging that

Raytheon had induced them to accept the 1991 Plan by

representing that the Plan would be the "best benefits package

that Raytheon would ever offer its employees" and then not

honoring this representation. Raytheon removed the case to the

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts

on the ground that plaintiffs' cause of action was preempted by

ERISA, and then moved to dismiss on the same ground. The

district court granted Raytheon's motion, but gave plaintiffs

leave to amend their complaint to set forth a claim under ERISA.

Plaintiffs did not and do not appeal from this ruling.

Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint

alleging that Raytheon's conduct with respect to the 1991 Plan

violated ERISA. Although it is not entirely clear, plaintiffs'

case theory appears to have been that Raytheon breached the 1991

Plan, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (permitting

suits by an ERISA plan's participants and beneficiaries to

recover benefits due, enforce rights, or clarify rights to

future benefits under the terms of the plan), by not offering

plaintiffs the same benefits offered to employees under the 1992

Plan. Raytheon again moved to dismiss and/or for summary

judgment, arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs' case theory did

not fit within the parameters of § 1132(a)(1)(B); that

plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies

with respect to the only ERISA plan arguably at issue in this

litigation; and that plaintiffs filed suit well after expiration

of the three-year limitations provision set forth in that same

ERISA plan.

On March 2, 200, the district court granted the motion.

In doing so, the court set forth its reasoning clearly and

succinctly:

Plaintiffs are unquestionably participants

in the 1991 Plan, whether it be an ERISA

plan or not. The difficulty with their

complaint is that they are not claiming

benefits due under that plan; nor are they

seeking to enforce any rights under the 1991

Plan. If they are asserting that because

defendant misrepresented the terms of the

1991 Plan, they are entitled to benefits

equal to those of the 1992 Plan, they have

no claim because the statute does not

authorize such a suit. If, on the other

hand, plaintiffs contend that, absent

defendant's misrepresentations, they would

be participants in the 1992 Plan and that

they are entitled to the benefits thereof,

then they would be bound by all of its

terms, including its claims review

procedures and three-year limitations

provision. It is undisputed that plaintiffs

have not followed, let alone exhausted, the

claims procedure contained in Article VI of

the 1992 Plan. Article VIII of the 1992

Plan requires any suit thereon to be brought

within three years after denial of a claim.

The record is clear, however, that

plaintiffs have known of defendant's refusal

to recognize their claim since, at the

latest, March 1993, nearly five years before

they instituted suit.

On appeal, plaintiffs broadly assert that the court's

ruling undermines ERISA's purposes and hint at theories of

recovery not fairly presented in the amended complaint. But

plaintiffs utterly fail to specify where and how the district

court went erred in ruling as it did. That being the case, and

because the court was entirely correct in its ruling and

reasoning, we affirm for the reasons set forth in the March 2,

2000 memorandum of decision. See, e.g., Ruiz Rivera v. Riley,

209 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2000).

Affirmed. Costs to appellee.

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