Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Board of Regist, (1st Cir. 2010)
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United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 09-1111
JOSEPH COGGESHALL AND L. LYNN LESUEUR,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Circuit Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Robert S. Wolfe, with whom Robert Wolfe Associates, P.C. was
on brief, for appellants.
Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on
brief, for appellees.
May 17, 2010
* Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.), of the Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal compels us to weave a
decisional tapestry from several doctrinal strands that help define
the margins of federal-court jurisdiction, including Eleventh
Amendment immunity, abstention, and standing. The appellants (a
psychologist and a third party) challenge a state administrative
proceeding that resulted in the imposition of professional
discipline against the psychologist. The district court determined
that it could not grant relief on any of the myriad claims
presented and, accordingly, dismissed the action. After careful
consideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Dr. L. Lynn LeSueur is a psychologist licensed to
practice in Massachusetts. When a seven-year-old boy who was
enrolled in an elementary school in Norfolk, Massachusetts, began
to experience behavioral problems, the school retained Dr. LeSueur
to evaluate him. Dr. LeSueur examined the child and interviewed
several people at the school. She then prepared and submitted a
written report.
[1]
Some family background helps to explain the etiology of
this litigation. The child whom Dr. LeSueur had examined came from
a broken home. When his parents divorced, the court awarded
custody to his mother and granted his father visitation rights.
The parents' post-divorce relationship was incendiary. Dr.
LeSueur's report added fuel to the fire: upon reviewing it, the
boy's mother lodged a complaint against Dr. LeSueur with the
Massachusetts Board of Registration of Psychologists (the Board).
The Board is the licensing and regulatory authority for
psychologists in Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112,
§§ 118-129B. After receiving the complaint, it held a formal
adjudicatory hearing. See id. ch. 30A, §§ 10-11. In due course,
it circulated a tentative decision, to which Dr. LeSueur objected.
The Board considered this objection and issued its final
decision on September 16, 2005. In substance, the Board determined
that Dr. LeSueur had exceeded the scope of her competence in
compiling the report (which contained, among other things,
recommendations pertaining to custody arrangements and to a
restraining order that the boy's mother had obtained against his
father). In reaching this conclusion, the Board found that Dr.
LeSueur's actions violated several provisions of the American
Psychological Association's code of conduct — a code previously
adopted by the Board. See 251 Mass. Code Regs. 1.10; see also
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 128. As a sanction, the Board placed
Dr. LeSueur on probation for a period of two years.
Dismayed by the Board's ukase, Dr. LeSueur petitioned for
judicial review in the state superior court. See Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 30A, § 14. Her petition alleged a salmagundi of federal
constitutional and state-law grounds for setting aside the Board's
order. It also sought a declaration that certain regulations on
which the Board had relied were unconstitutionally vague.
[2]
Dr. LeSueur moved for judgment on the pleadings. After
considering Dr. LeSueur's legal and constitutional arguments and
her charge of evidentiary insufficiency, the superior court denied
the motion for judgment on the pleadings and, on July 11, 2006,
dismissed the petition for judicial review. Dr. LeSueur appealed,
but the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the judgment. LeSueur
v. Bd. of Regist. of Psychologists, 906 N.E.2d 1031 (Mass. App. Ct.
2009) (table). Dr. LeSueur did not seek further appellate review
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). See Mass.
R. App. P. 27.1 (authorizing petitions for discretionary appellate
review by the SJC).
During the pendency of the state-court proceedings, Dr.
LeSueur and Coggeshall repaired to the federal district court and,
on August 23, 2008, instituted an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, against the Board and its members.
[3]
The federal complaint
asserted claims that paralleled those asserted in the state courts,
including multiple challenges to the constitutionality of the
Board's actions and the regulations. Like the state-court
petition, the federal complaint sought both declaratory relief and
vacation of the sanction imposed by the Board.
Despite these similarities, this federal-court action
differed from the earlier state-court proceedings in two noteworthy
respects. First, the federal action encompassed a more diverse
group of parties. In the federal court, Coggeshall appeared as a
party for the first time, and the members of the Board were named
as additional defendants. Second, the federal-court action sought
a wider panoply of relief, including money damages and an
injunction barring the Board from enforcing the challenged
regulations.
The named defendants moved to dismiss the federal suit.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6). The district court obliged.
With respect to Dr. LeSueur's claims for nonmonetary relief, the
court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because those claims sought
vacation of a state-court decision involving functionally identical
claims. Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. of Regist. of Psychologists, No.
08-CV-11491, 2008 WL 5412290, at *2-3 (D. Mass. Dec. 28, 2008). In
support, the court cited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). As an alternate
basis for dismissal, the court held that even if it had
jurisdiction, it would be constrained to abstain. Coggeshall, 2008
WL 5412290, at *3 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41
(1971)). At the same time, the court dismissed Coggeshall's
nonmonetary claims for a perceived lack of standing to sue. Id.
Finally, the court dismissed the claims for money damages on
immunity grounds. Id. at *3 n.3. This timely appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
Before grappling with the appellants' asseverational
array, we pause to delineate our analytic framework. First, we
segregate the appellants' monetary claims from their nonmonetary
claims. We then address the two sets of claims in that order.
Our standard of review is uncontroversial. Although the
district court's rulings implicate different subsections of Rule
12(b), we review all of those rulings de novo. See McCloskey v.
Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 266 (1st Cir. 2006). In undertaking this
review, we are not wedded to the district court's rationale, but,
rather, may affirm a particular order on any independent ground
made manifest by the record. Id.
A. Money Damages.
We start with the appellants' claims for money damages.
These claims are preferred against both the Board and its members.
The Board itself, as an arm of the state government, enjoys
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits for money damages brought in
federal court, absent consent, waiver, or the like. See Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756-57 (1999); Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v.
Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 477 (1st Cir. 2009); see also U.S. Const.
amend. XI. Massachusetts has neither consented to be sued for
damages in a federal court in the circumstances of this case nor
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity here. Consequently, that
immunity demands the dismissal of the damages claims against the
Board.
[4]
With respect to the damages claims against the members of
the Board, there is a threshold ambiguity: the appellants sued the
members of the Board without specifying whether those defendants
were named in their official or individual capacities. As we
explain below, we need not resolve this ambiguity.
To the extent that the members of the Board are sued in
their official capacities, they stand in the shoes of the state and
enjoy the same immunity as does the Board. See, e.g., Rosie D. ex
rel. John D. v. Swift, 310 F.3d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 2002). Thus,
any claims against the members of the Board in their official
capacities must be dismissed.
To the extent that the appellants' claims for money
damages are brought against the members of the Board individually,
the key question involves the applicability of the doctrine of
quasi-judicial immunity. In general, that doctrine provides
absolute immunity for public officials, including agency officials,
who perform quasi-judicial functions. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 508, 512-13 (1978). The rationale for the immunity is that
the due performance of an adjudicative role "require[s] a full
exemption from liability." Id. at 508; see also Destek Group, Inc.
v. N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 318 F.3d 32, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2003).
We do not write on a pristine page. This court addressed
a virtually identical issue in an earlier case. See Bettencourt v.
Bd. of Regist. in Med., 904 F.2d 772 (1st Cir. 1990). There, we
held that the members of the Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Medicine were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for their actions
taken as adjudicators in disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 784. In
reaching this result, we performed a functional analysis. See id.
at 782-83; see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 508, 512-13.
In Bettencourt, this analysis led us to conclude that the
board members were "functionally comparable" to judges because
their roles involved weighing evidence, making factual findings,
reaching legal determinations, choosing sanctions, and expounding
reasons for their decisions. 904 F.2d at 783. The board members
also resembled judges because their duties required them to make
determinations likely to provoke litigious reactions from affected
parties. Id. Finally, we observed that board members resembled
judges because they carried out adjudicatory functions in
structured proceedings replete with procedural safeguards.
[5]
Id.
The Board of Registration in Medicine, which was at issue
in Bettencourt, is responsible for professional discipline of
medical doctors. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, §§ 2-9B. The
adjudicatory functions of its members are the same as those of the
members of the Board, except that the Board's purview concerns
psychologists rather than physicians. For present purposes, that
is a distinction that makes no meaningful difference.
In the last analysis, what matters is that the functions
of the members of the two bodies — the Board of Registration in
Medicine and the Board of Registration of Psychologists — are
legally indistinguishable. Because this is so and because the acts
for which the defendants have been sued were performed by them as
adjudicators, Bettencourt controls here. See United States v.
Platte, 577 F.3d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that a prior,
on-point panel decision normally binds subsequent panels).
Accordingly, we hold that the members of the Board, individually,
are shielded from the damages claims by reason of quasi-judicial
immunity. See Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 783-84.
B. Nonmonetary Claims.
We divide this portion of our analysis into two segments,
one for each appellant.
1. Dr. LeSueur's Claims. In dismissing Dr. LeSueur's
claims for nonmonetary relief, the district court elaborated two
grounds: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention. We
examine these alternative holdings.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes "the losing party
in state court [from filing] suit in federal court after the state
proceedings [have] ended, complaining of an injury caused by the
state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that
judgment." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 291 (2005). The district court erred in relying upon the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because, at the time that the appellants
filed their federal complaint, the state case was still pending
before the Massachusetts Appeals Court. It is a condition
precedent to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine that,
at the time the federal-court suit is commenced, the state-court
proceedings have ended. Federación de Maestros v. Junta de
Relaciones del Trabajo, 410 F.3d 17, 24-29 (1st Cir. 2005). Here,
the state-court proceedings had not yet ended, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was inapposite.
[6]
The district court's other rationale for dismissing
these claims is more persuasive. This rationale involves the
Younger abstention doctrine. If certain conditions are met, that
doctrine requires a district court to stay or dismiss the federal
action in favor of the continued prosecution of the state-court
litigation. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. The district court
thought that those conditions were satisfied here. We agree.
Abstention is a device designed to facilitate the side-by-side operation of federal and state courts, balancing their
respective interests in the spirit of comity. See Younger, 401
U.S. at 44. There are several branches of the abstention doctrine.
See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 331-34 (1943); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01
(1941). Our concern here is with Younger abstention.
Under Younger principles, a federal court must abstain
from hearing a case if doing so would "needlessly inject" the
federal court into ongoing state proceedings. Brooks v. N.H.
Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 637 (1st Cir. 1996). Although the
Younger case itself dealt with federal interference in an ongoing
state criminal prosecution, 401 U.S. at 41, Younger principles
apply to noncriminal state proceedings that are judicial in
nature.
[7]
See Maymó-Meléndez v. Alvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 31
& n.3 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986).
Courtshave developed a tripartite model for determining
the appropriateness of Younger abstention. This model requires
that "(1) the [ongoing state] proceedings are judicial (as opposed
to legislative) in nature; (2) they implicate important state
interests; and (3) they provide an adequate opportunity to raise
federal constitutional challenges." Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 777.
These three elements all must be assessed as of the date when the
federal complaint is filed. Id.
In this instance, it is beyond peradventure that the
relevant state proceedings were judicial in nature. See id. at
778. It is likewise undeniable that Dr. LeSueur's petition for
judicial review was still pending before the Massachusetts Appeals
Court when the appellants commenced the federal case (and, thus,
that the state proceedings were ongoing at the relevant time).
Similarly, it needs little embellishment to establish
that the state has a profound interest in the licensure of health-care professionals (such as psychologists) and the maintenance of
appropriate standards of practice for such professionals. The
decided cases describing the state's interest in the licensing and
disciplining of physicians spell out the reasons, see, e.g., id. at
778; Weinberg v. Bd. of Regist. in Med., 824 N.E.2d 38, 46 (Mass.
2005), and it would serve no useful purpose to repastinate that
well-plowed ground.
This leaves the third element of the model. On this
point, Dr. LeSueur strives to convince us that Massachusetts does
not provide an adequate forum in which to litigate federal
constitutional challenges. We are not persuaded.
We are, of course, obliged to presume that state courts
are "fully capable of safeguarding federal constitutional rights."
Brooks, 80 F.3d at 639. Here, moreover, the statutory scheme that
Massachusetts has enacted to provide for judicial review of
administrative actions specifically directs reviewing courts to
inquire into allegations of constitutional violations. See Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 14(7)(a), (d), (g). Massachusetts courts have
shown no reluctance to carry out this mandate. See, e.g.,
Weinberg, 824 N.E.2d at 46 (considering a First Amendment challenge
and other constitutional claims). To the extent that Dr. LeSueur's
argument is that the mere allegation of a federal constitutional
infraction automatically renders state procedures inadequate, that
argument is hopeless. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 477 U.S. at 628.
We need not delve into the merits of Dr. LeSueur's
cavalcade of First Amendment, vagueness, equal protection, and due
process claims. For the purpose of Younger abstention, the only
question is whether the state courts provide an adequate
opportunity to litigate such claims fully and fairly. Duty Free
Shop, Inc. v. Administratión de Terrenos, 889 F.2d 1181, 1183 (1st
Cir. 1989). That the Massachusetts courts provide such an
opportunity cannot seriously be questioned. Indeed, Dr. LeSueur
presented the majority of her constitutional claims, including the
claim that state law affords insufficient protections to satisfy
the federal constitutional minimum, in state court — albeit
unsuccessfully — and she could have presented the rest, had she
elected to do so.
We hasten to add that any argument that the state courts
erred in deciding these issues could have been presented by Dr.
LeSueur through a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The lower federal
courts cannot be used as a substitute forum for federal appellate
review of final decisions of state courts. The Supreme Court is
the only federal court empowered to reverse a final judgment of a
state court. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. By eschewing any
effort to secure further appellate review before the SJC, Dr.
LeSueur closed the door to Supreme Court review of the state
courts' decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S.
619, 620 (1981) (per curiam). That, in turn, closed the door to
any federal-court review of those decisions.
[8]
To say more on this point would be supererogatory. This
case is a paradigm for Younger abstention. The fact that the state
proceedings are now ended does not alter that reality. See
Bettencourt 904 F.2d at 777. Consequently, we uphold the order of
dismissal on that ground.
2. Coggeshall's Claims. We next consider Coggeshall's
nonmonetary claims. The district court ruled that Coggeshall
lacked standing to pursue his claims because he had no legally
cognizable stake in the outcome. Coggeshall argues that he has
standing because the sanction imposed in the disciplinary
proceeding transgressed his First Amendment right to receive
medical advice on behalf of his minor child.
[9]
Standing is both a constitutional and a prudential
limitation on federal jurisdiction. N.H. Right to Life PAC v.
Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1996). To satisfy the
Constitution's "case or controversy" requirement, U.S. Const. art.
III, a party seeking relief in federal court must show that he has
suffered an actual injury, which is fairly traceable to the
defendant's conduct and redressable by a favorable judicial
decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992); N.H. Right to Life, 99 F.3d at 13.
In the case at hand, we need not look beyond the first of
these requirements. In contemplation of law, Coggeshall has not
suffered any injury in fact because he has not shown a deprivation
of any constitutionally protected property or liberty interest — a
failing that goes to the very heart of the standing requirement.
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
To illustrate, he has shown no interference with any
contractual relationship; the school hired Dr. LeSueur, not
Coggeshall. At any rate, nothing in the Board's order prevented
Coggeshall from engaging Dr. LeSueur directly,
[10]
but the complaint
does not allege that he tried to do so. And there was no mystery
about Dr. LeSueur's advice; Coggeshall acknowledges, at least
implicitly, that he reviewed a copy of Dr. LeSueur's report.
Regardless of the Board's actions, Coggeshall remained free to act
on the recommendations contained in that report. Last — but far
from least — the Board did not in any way purpose to limit the type
of treatment that Coggeshall's son could receive.
In an effort to fill this void, Coggeshall attempts to
assert the rights of Dr. LeSueur and other psychologists to be free
from what he describes as the "chilling effects" of professional
discipline. But this horse has long since left the barn. Due to
prudential limitations on standing, a party, under ordinary
circumstances, may not assert the First Amendment rights of a third
party. IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009). The fact that this
principle is relaxed somewhat in the First Amendment context does
not eviscerate it. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004). Third-party overbreadth challenges must be based on
"specific reasons weighty enough to overcome" the concerns
prudential requirements police. Id.; see Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973).
Thus, while the courts have carved an exception to this
rule for cases in which a third party is unable to assert her own
rights, see, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991);
Payne-Barahona v. Gonzáles, 474 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2007), the
derivative claim in this case is not of that genre. Nothing
hindered Dr. LeSueur from asserting her own right to be free from
what Coggeshall describes as the chilling effects of professional
discipline (and, indeed, she has forcefully asserted that right).
Consequently, Coggeshall's jus tertii claim fails. See IMS Health,
550 F.3d at 49-50; Benjamin v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 F.3d
101, 106 (1st Cir. 1995).
In all events, Coggeshall's derivative claim does not
assert a cognizable First Amendment injury. Simply because speech
occurs does not exempt those who practice a profession from state
regulation (including the imposition of disciplinary sanctions).
See, e.g., Orhalik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 459
(1978); Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal.
Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053-55 (9th Cir. 2000). A
patient, suffering no injury himself, does not hold a First
Amendment trump card that may be played to rescue a licensed
practitioner from state-imposed disciplinary sanctions. See
Orhalik, 436 U.S. at 462 n.20; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-14
(1972).
To sum up, we agree with the district court that
Coggeshall suffered no legally cognizable injury in fact as a
result of the Board's actions. It follows inexorably that
Coggeshall lacks standing to pursue his nonmonetary claims.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the
appellants' suit.
Affirmed.
Footnotes
[1] ' The report was not made part of the record before the
district court. The appellants — Dr. LeSueur and the boy's father,
Joseph Coggeshall — attempted to supplement the record on appeal,
but that attempt was rebuffed. Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. of Regist.
of Psychologists, No. 09-1111 (1st Cir. May 22, 2009) (unpublished
order).
[2] ' In addition, the petition sought declaratory relief under
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231A, § 1. The superior court dismissed this
claim as "subsumed within" judicial review of the administrative
action. That determination is not challenged here.
[3] ' Section 1983 imposes liability upon those acting under color
of state law who "subject[], or cause[] to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities" secured by the federal
Constitution or by federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[4] ' We do not imply that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims only
for money damages. That is not the case. See, e.g., Rosie D. ex
rel. John D. v. Swift, 310 F.3d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 2002). Here,
however, we dispose of the nonmonetary claims on other grounds.
[5] ' The appellants' assertion that Dr. LeSueur's disciplinary
proceeding was conducted amidst inadequate procedural safeguards is
a Trojan horse. This assertion seeks to have us consider a
constitutional claim under circumstances in which such
consideration is barred by Younger. See infra Part II(B)(1).
[6] ' The fact that the state proceedings have now run their
course does not call for a different conclusion. For Rooker-Feldman purposes, courts must look to the situation as it existed
when the federal suit was commenced. See Federación de Maestros,
410 F.3d at 24; Maymó-Meléndez v. Alvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2004).
[7] ' There is an open question as to whether Younger abstention
principles apply to claims for money damages. See Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gómez, 585 F.3d 508, 516 n.14 (1st Cir. 2009).
We are not tasked with answering that question here because the
damages claims are otherwise barred. See supra Part II(A).
[8] ' To be sure, the Younger doctrine permits inferior federal
courts to intervene in ongoing state litigation in rare, tightly
circumscribed instances. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.
v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366 (1989);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611-12 (1975); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). Dr. LeSueur's claims do not
fit within the narrow confines of any such exception.
[9] ' The First Amendment applies to state action through the
medium of the Fourteenth Amendment. See N.H. Right to Life PAC v.
Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 10 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996).
[10] ' Although the Board placed Dr. LeSueur on probation, she was
allowed to continue to see patients during the term of her
probation.
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