Boccio v. Dennehy, (1st Cir. 2008)

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United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-2272

FRANCIS HANNON,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

RAYMOND COOK; SEAN MILLIKEN; WAYNE D. CROSBY; LAWRENCE M.

MCARTHUR; KEVIN KING; HENRY LAPLANTE; WILLIAM WHITE;

CHRISTOPHER DEMARCO; ANGEL PIMENTAL; JOSEPH LODICO;

STEVEN BALSAVICH; and EDWARD KEITH,

Plaintiffs,

 

v.

JEFFREY BEARD and MARYJANE HESSE,

Defendants, Appellees,

MICHAEL T. MALONEY; PETER ALLEN; KRISTIE LADOUCEUR;

KENNETH DEORSEY; PAUL DUFORD; JEFFREY GRIMES; RICHARD MEDEIROS;

GILBERT LEMON, II; JOHN DOES 1-50; CLARK COLOR LAB;

VINCENT MOONEY; MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

FREDERICK CALLENDAR; RICHARD MCARTHUR; JAMES SULLIVAN;

GARY FYFE; ROBERT KOLBER; and HERBERT BERGER-HERSHKOWITZ,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Wallace,

[1]

Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

    Matthew J. Matule, with whom David S. Clancy and Christopher

G. Clark, was on brief for appellant Hannon.

    Claudia M. Tesoro, Senior Deputy Attorney General, with whom

Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General, Calvin R. Koons, Senior

Deputy Attorney General, and John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy

Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Litigation Section, was on brief

for appellees Beard and Hesse.

 

April 28, 2008

         WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge. Francis Hannon appeals

from the district court’s final order dismissing his claims against

Jeffrey Beard and Maryjane Hesse for lack of personal jurisdiction.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. We affirm in

part and reverse and remand in part.

I. 

         Hannon’s claims against Beard and Hesse are part of a

multi-party, multi-claim lawsuit filed in the district court for

the District of Massachusetts. Hannon and his fellow plaintiffs,

all prisoners in Massachusetts, alleged various federal and state

constitutional violations against numerous defendants, most of whom

were officials in the Massachusetts Department of Corrections

(DOC). However, Hannon, who was convicted in Pennsylvania and has

spent most of his prison time there, also included a claim against

Beard and Hesse, who were officials in the Pennsylvania DOC during

the time periods relevant to this action.

         Since his 1978 conviction and incarceration in

Pennsylvania, Hannon has been the quintessential “jailhouse

lawyer,” pursuing post-conviction relief and filing numerous

grievances and lawsuits on behalf of himself and other prisoners

challenging their conditions of confinement. Hannon estimates that

he has represented “thousands” of his fellow inmates in

proceedings. He alleges that the Pennsylvania DOC grew tired of

his lawsuits and agitation and, in order to prevent him from filing

more lawsuits and in retaliation for the actions he had already

taken, began a strategy of transferring him to out-of-state

prisons.

         Transfers of state prisoners to prisons in other states

are effected pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact

(Compact), which generally permits states to contract for one

state’s incarceration of another state’s convicts in consideration

for payment. Pursuant to the Compact, Hannon was transferred in

1997 to a District of Columbia prison and, in the first several

months of 2001, was transferred to another District of Columbia

prison, two different Maryland prisons, and eventually back to

Pennsylvania. In December of 2001, he was transferred from

Pennsylvania to Massachusetts. Hannon alleges that his legal

materials “disappeared” during the transfer to Massachusetts.

         Hannon asserts that the decision to transfer him to

Massachusetts was authorized and directed by Beard, the Secretary

of the Pennsylvania DOC, in retaliation for Hannon’s lawsuits

against DOC officers. Hannon states that this fact was confirmed

by prison personnel with whom he spoke. Though Beard asserted that

he has not been involved with Hannon subsequent to the transfer, he

did not deny involvement leading up to the transfer.

         Once in Massachusetts, Hannon sent a number of letters to

Hesse, a Pennsylvania DOC prison librarian, requesting legal

materials. She responded several times, sometimes denying his

requests and sometimes sending requested material either to him or

to a prison librarian in Massachusetts. At times, she sought legal

counsel’s advice to determine whether she was required to send the

requested materials. She states that every time she denied a

request for material, it was because legal counsel had advised her

that she was not required to supply Hannon with it.

         In 2003, Hannon filed a complaint against Beard and

Hesse, as well as against numerous Massachusetts prison officials,

in the Massachusetts district court. His claims against Beard and

Hesse allege that they violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights and his rights under Articles XI and XII of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by transferring him between

prisons, confiscating his legal materials, and refusing to provide

him with requested legal materials.

         In January 2007, after he filed this action, Hannon

learned that he was to be transferred yet again. His emergency

motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining the transfer was

denied, and this was affirmed by us on appeal. He was transferred

to New Jersey.

         Beard and Hesse filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among

other things, that the Massachusetts district court lacked personal

jurisdiction over them. On June 26, 2007, the district court

granted the motion and dismissed Hannon’s claims against Hesse and

Beard for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that

the long-arm statute did not reach Hesse or Beard because they did

not “transact business” within Massachusetts: “The decision to

transfer plaintiff and confiscate legal materials all occurred in

Pennsylvania where the Pennsylvania defendants reside.” The

district court concluded that a transfer pursuant to the Compact

does not alone constitute the transaction of business in

Massachusetts. Because the district court dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction, it did not reach any of the other grounds for

dismissal argued in Beard and Hesse’s motion to dismiss. Several

of Hannon’s claims against other defendants, as well as other

plaintiffs’ claims, survived motions to dismiss. Final judgment on

the dismissal of the claims against Beard and Hesse was entered

pursuant to Hannon’s Rule 54(b) motion, and Hannon timely appealed.

II. 

         It is axiomatic that, “[t]o hear a case, a court must

have personal jurisdiction over the parties, ‘that is, the power to

require the parties to obey its decrees.’” Daynard v. Ness,

Motley, Loadholt, Richardson, & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st

Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d

30, 35 (1st Cir. 1999)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.”

Daynard, 290 F.3d at 50. Under the prima facie standard, which the

district court applied, we “accept the plaintiff’s (properly

documented) evidentiary proffers as true,” and construe those facts

“in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional

claim.” Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We review the district court’s application of this standard de

novo. Id.

         Hannon has not alleged that Beard or Hesse “has engaged

in continuous and systematic activity” in Massachusetts; so, in the

absence of general jurisdiction, the court’s power will depend upon

the existence of specific jurisdiction. See id. at 51. “Specific

jurisdiction exists when there is a demonstrable nexus between a

plaintiff’s claims and a defendant’s forum-based activities, such

as when the litigation itself is founded directly on those

activities.” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n,

142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). Furthermore, to establish

personal jurisdiction, Hannon must show that “the Massachusetts

long-arm statute grants jurisdiction and, if it does, that the

exercise of jurisdiction under the statute is consistent with the

Constitution.” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52.

A. 

         Because we have construed the Massachusetts long-arm

statute to be coextensive with the limits allowed by the United

States Constitution, we often “sidestep the statutory inquiry and

proceed directly to the constitutional analysis.” See id.

However, Hannon’s claim involves Pennsylvania state officials’

exercise of their discretion, rather than a conventional contract

or tort claim. It would be useful therefore to consider first, as

the district court did, whether the Massachusetts long-arm statute

reaches Beard as the Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC and Hesse as

a prison librarian for the Pennsylvania DOC. See Stroman Realty,

Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 482 (5th Cir. 2008) (reasoning

that, although a long-arm statute was coextensive with the limits

of due process, the statute’s reach warranted consideration first

because the case involved a challenge to a state official rather

than a conventional contract or tort claim).

         Hannon’s assertion of personal jurisdiction under the

long-arm statute is based on the portion of that statute providing

that “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,

who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or

equity arising from the person’s transacting any business in this

commonwealth.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a). That provision

“should be construed broadly,” and “does not require that the

defendant have engaged in commercial activity. [The] language is

general and applies to any purposeful acts by an individual,

whether personal, private, or commercial.” Ealing Corp. v. Harrods

Ltd., 790 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Physical presence in Massachusetts is not required in

order to “transact business” in Massachusetts. Fairview Mach. &

Tool Co., Inc. v. Oakbrook Int’l, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137 (D.

Mass. 1999). For example, in Hahn v. Vermont Law School, we held

that a law school “transacted business” in Massachusetts when, at

plaintiff’s request, it mailed application information to him in

Massachusetts and later mailed him an offer of admission. 698 F.2d

48, 49 (1st Cir. 1983). We reasoned that “[t]he purposeful actions

of [Vermont Law School] in mailing to [plaintiff] in Massachusetts

application information and an acceptance letter were sufficient,

without more, to constitute transacting business under the broadly

construed Massachusetts long-arm statute.” Id. at 51. Though the

mailing of the application and offer of admission were not

substantial contacts, we emphasized that “less is required to

support jurisdiction when the cause of action arises from the

defendant’s contacts with the forum . . . than when it does not.”

Id.

         To support jurisdiction in this case, Hannon alleges that

Beard “authorized, directed, and/or effected” his transfer from the

Pennsylvania DOC to the Massachusetts DOC pursuant to the Compact.

The Compact creates a five-year agreement between the states, and

outlines the specific procedures for transferring inmates.

According to the terms of the Compact, Pennsylvania was required to

send an application to Massachusetts requesting to transfer Hannon,

arrange and pay for Hannon’s transportation to a Massachusetts

institution, transfer funds owed to Hannon to Massachusetts,

furnish documents and provide legal advice as necessary to

Massachusetts, pre-authorize and pay for Hannon’s medical,

psychiatric, and dental care or treatment in Massachusetts, and

authorize Hannon’s security classification, among other things.

Massachusetts, in turn, was obligated to make regular reports to

Pennsylvania on Hannon’s conduct. See 61 P.S. § 1062; Mass. Gen.

Law ch. 125 App., § 2-1. In sum, as Hannon alleges, when Beard

arranged for the transfer between the Pennsylvania DOC and the

Massachusetts DOC pursuant to an existing, on-going contract

between the two, he “caused extensive services to be rendered in

Massachusetts, caused payment to be made in Massachusetts, and

procured the application of Massachusetts law to [] Hannon’s future

conduct.”

         The contacts that Beard would have had to make to arrange

for Hannon’s transfer from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts are

sufficient to constitute “transacting business” under the broadly-construed long-arm statute. The district court erred when it

reasoned that because “[t]he decision to transfer plaintiff . . .

occurred in Pennsylvania,” it lacked jurisdiction over Beard. A

defendant need not have been physically present in the forum state

in order to have “transacted business” there. See Fairview Mach.,

56 F. Supp. 2d at 138. Just as mailing a letter and an offer of

admission to Massachusetts was “transacting business” in Hahn, see

698 F.2d at 51, so can actions arranging for the transfer of Hannon

to Massachusetts, which necessarily involved at least some

communication and interaction between Beard in Pennsylvania and his

counterparts in Massachusetts.

         That Beard’s actions were not “commercial” is not

relevant, see Ealing Corp., 790 F.2d at 982, nor is the fact that

he was a state official. Beard’s citation to the Fifth Circuit’s

decision in Stroman Realty does not help him. That case was filed

in Texas and involved a challenge to an Arizona government

official’s enforcement of Arizona law in Arizona; the action

attacked the validity of that law. See Stroman Realty, 513 F.3d at

481. By contrast, Hannon does not challenge the laws that permit

a transfer, but rather alleges that Beard initiated the transfer in

retaliation for and in order to hinder Hannon’s exercise of

constitutional rights.

         Beard cites no case that suggests that prison officials

cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in a foreign state

merely because they are state officials. Certainly, there are

constitutional limitations on a plaintiff’s ability to hale a

prison official into another state, which we address shortly.

Under these circumstances, though, we hold that Beard “transacted

business” in Massachusetts for purposes of the state’s long-arm

statute, particularly because the contacts Hannon alleges form the

basis for Hannon’s claim against Beard.

         Hannon’s jurisdictional case for Hesse is far less

persuasive. Hannon bases his argument on Hesse’s responses to a

number of written requests for legal materials that he sent to her

from a Massachusetts prison. At least twice Hesse sent requested

materials to a Massachusetts prison librarian (and so advised

Hannon), about six times she denied Hannon’s requests after

receiving advice from legal counsel that she was not obligated to

send the materials, and three times she directly sent Hannon the

requested material.

         These limited interactions do not constitute "transacting

business" under the Massachusetts long-arm statute. Hesse did not

initiate contact with Hannon, and she did not purposefully direct

any action toward Massachusetts. She had nothing to do with

Hannon’s transfer there, and it was merely incidental that she sent

replies to Massachusetts because that was where he happened to have

been transferred. Our cases make clear that contacts with the

forum state must be “purposeful” in order to constitute the

transaction of business. See Ealing Corp., 790 F.2d at 982.

Hesse’s responses to Hannon’s letters were not purposeful contacts

with Massachusetts. We therefore hold that the district court did

not err when it dismissed Hannon’s claim against Hesse for lack of

personal jurisdiction because the Massachusetts long-arm statute

does not authorize personal jurisdiction over Hesse.

B. 

         Having determined that the Massachusetts long-arm statute

permits jurisdiction over Beard, we must decide whether asserting

jurisdiction over him would comport with the requirements of due

process. “In the personal jurisdiction context, we have

characterized compliance with the Constitution as implicating three

distinct components, namely, relatedness, purposeful availment

(sometimes called ‘minimum contacts’), and reasonableness.” See

Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

1. 

         The first step to achieving personal jurisdiction is that

“a claim must arise out of, or be related to, the defendant’s in-forum activities.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The relatedness standard is flexible and “focuses on the

nexus between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s cause of

action.” Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In typical tort

claims, our inquiry is “whether the plaintiff has established cause

in fact (i.e., the injury would not have occurred but for the

defendant’s forum-state activity) and legal cause (i.e., the

defendant’s in-state conduct gave birth to the cause of action).”

Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Although Hannon alleges a constitutional claim,

section 1983 claims have been analogized to tort claims for

personal jurisdiction analysis. See, e.g., Stroman Realty, 513

F.3d at 483 (“It also seems normally accurate to describe as torts

. . . § 1983 suits against public officials for individual

misconduct”).

         Though the relatedness standard has been described as the

least developed part of the due process standard, see, e.g., Swiss

Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d at 621, it seems clear that Hannon’s

claims against Beard arise from Beard’s voluntary contacts with

Massachusetts. Hannon alleges that Beard ordered him transferred

among numerous facilities along the East Coast, including

Massachusetts, in retaliation for his numerous lawsuits against the

Pennsylvania DOC on behalf of himself and on behalf of other

prisoners. Beard’s contacts with Massachusetts in arranging for

Hannon’s transfer are therefore directly related to Hannon’s

retaliation claim, which is based on the transfer itself. Hannon’s

alleged constitutional injury would not have occurred “but for”

Beard’s arrangement for his transfer.

         That Hannon was not a party to the Compact or

arrangements made between Beard and Massachusetts is not relevant

to this relatedness analysis. Though it was not argued in the

briefs, Beard’s counsel at oral argument stressed that, because

Hannon was not a party to the Compact between Pennsylvania and

Massachusetts, the Compact and any arrangements made pursuant to it

cannot be used by Hannon to assert jurisdiction over Beard.

Indeed, Article XXXII of the Intergovernmental Agreement for the

Implementation of the Compact restricts any rights under the

agreement to the state parties. However, Beard provided no case

law for the proposition that only a party to a contract can use the

contract as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over

another party to the contract, and we conclude that the proposition

is unsound as applied to this situation. First, the relatedness

requirement focuses on the nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and

the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not on the

relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. See Sawtelle v.

Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1389 (1st Cir. 1995). This suggests it does

not matter that the Compact was not between Hannon and Beard, but

only that it established ties between Beard and Massachusetts, and

that it formed the basis of Hannon’s complaint.

         Second, Hannon’s claim is not for breach of contract. He

does not argue that his treatment in Massachusetts or even that the

transfer to Massachusetts violated the Compact. Rather, Hannon

raises a constitutional claim, arguing that the transfer was in

retaliation for his exercise of constitutional rights. This claim

is more analogous to a tort claim than a contract claim for

jurisdictional purposes, see Stroman Realty, 513 F.3d at 483, and

tort claims are different than contract claims for relatedness

purposes. Thus, our analysis must focus on whether Beard’s actions

in transferring Hannon to Massachusetts caused Hannon’s injury,

rather than on the contractual relationship (or lack thereof)

between the two.

         Finally, we stress that Hannon’s claim based on the

unconstitutionality of the transfer itself is critical to our

analysis. One of Beard’s principal arguments against asserting

personal jurisdiction on the basis of participation in the Compact

is that it would subject Beard and his counterparts across the

country to lawsuits in every state that is a party to the Compact.

While we understand his concern, our decision ought not have this

affect. Several district courts have declined to exercise personal

jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants when prisoners

transferred pursuant to the Compact sue their former prison

officials in foreign states. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dist. of

Columbia, 357 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192-93 (D.D.C. 2004); Meyer v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 940 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1996); see

also Hannon v. Beard, No. 02-1779 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2003), aff’d,

No. 03-7145, 2005 WL 18052 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2005). Our holding

is not in conflict with those decisions. In those cases, the

prisoners sued officials from the sending state for harms that

occurred while the prisoner was in the sending state, and attempted

to use the contacts of the Compact to assert jurisdiction.

According to the reasoning of our holding, those claims would not

survive the relatedness inquiry because the alleged contacts (the

transfer pursuant to the Compact) are not related to the alleged

harm (treatment in the sending state). This case turns on the

unique factual situation wherein the harm alleged was directly tied

to the contacts establishing personal jurisdiction. It is not a

free ticket for personal jurisdiction in receiving states over any

prison officials who are parties to the Compact. But here, because

Hannon’s claim arises directly from Beard’s contacts with

Massachusetts, the claim is sufficiently related under the due

process standard. In short, our opinion gives no assistance for a

transferred prisoner to assert a claim in the transferee court

against the transferor DOC based on pre-transfer grievances.

2. 

         That a defendant’s forum-state contacts are related to a

plaintiff’s claims is not enough to justify an assertion of

personal jurisdiction. The defendant’s contacts must also

“represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting

activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and

protections of that state’s laws and making the defendant’s

presence before the state’s courts foreseeable.” Daynard, 290 F.3d

at 60. The purposeful availment requirement “ensures that

jurisdiction is not based on merely random, isolated or fortuitous

contacts with the forum state,” Adelson, 510 F.3d at 50 (internal

quotation marks omitted), and is based upon the “cornerstones [of]

. . . voluntariness and foreseeability,” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 61.

This means that “[t]he contacts must be voluntary and not based on

the unilateral actions of another party” and “must be such that [a

defendant] could reasonably anticipate being haled into court

there.” Adelson, 510 F.3d at 50 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). “Even if a defendant’s contacts with the forum

are deemed voluntary, the purposeful availment prong of the

jurisdictional test investigates whether the defendant benefitted

from those contacts in a way that made jurisdiction foreseeable.”

Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 292

(1st Cir. 1999).

          Whether Beard’s actions in transferring Hannon from

Pennsylvania to Massachusetts were a purposeful availment of the

privilege of conducting business in Massachusetts is a close

question. But we are convinced that Beard’s contacts with

Massachusetts were not “random, isolated or fortuitous.” See

Adelson, 510 F.3d at 50. According to Hannon’s factual

allegations, Beard intentionally and voluntarily transferred Hannon

out of Pennsylvania and into Massachusetts to rid himself of a

vexatious prisoner and to retaliate against Hannon for his frequent

litigation. In so doing, he made Hannon subject to Massachusetts

law. Arguably, Beard benefitted from subjecting Hannon to

Massachusetts prisons and Massachusetts law by ridding himself of

a troublemaker.

         Furthermore, if it is true that Beard’s transfer was made

for unconstitutional reasons, Beard could not only have foreseen

that Hannon would sue him but that Hannon would sue him in

Massachusetts. In fact, the Compact provides that, “The sending

state and receiving state will cooperate in other matters of mutual

interest in the defense of transfer-related litigation.” That

expressly contemplates the possibility of transfer-related

litigation, and it seems reasonable to expect that the litigation

could occur in either the sending state or the receiving state.

Based on the voluntariness of Beard’s alleged actions and the

foreseeability that the transfer would spur litigation in

Massachusetts, we conclude that Beard purposefully availed himself

of the privilege of doing business in Massachusetts and established

the requisite minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process

concerns.

3. 

         Finally, after considering whether a defendant’s contacts

are related to a plaintiff’s claim and whether the defendant

purposefully availed himself of the benefits of doing business in

the forum state, we ask whether asserting personal jurisdiction

would be reasonable. The factors we examine to consider

reasonableness are: “(1) the defendant’s burden of appearing, (2)

the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,

(4) the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most effective

resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all

sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies.” Id. at 51.

         First, Beard has not shown an unusual hardship would

result from having to appear in Massachusetts. It is true that

appearing in Massachusetts is more burdensome for Beard than

appearing in Pennsylvania. However, “staging a defense in a

foreign jurisdiction is almost always inconvenient and/or costly,”

so “this factor is only meaningful where a party can demonstrate

some kind of special or unusual burden.” See Pritzker v. Yari, 42

F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that travel between New York

and Puerto Rico was not an unusual burden for a defendant). Beard

gives no reason why appearing in Massachusetts would be a special

burden beyond ordinary inconvenience, so this factor weighs in

favor of asserting personal jurisdiction.

         Second, Massachusetts may have an interest in

adjudicating this dispute. Hannon argues that Massachusetts has a

significant interest in ensuring that out-of-state defendants do

not retaliate against unwanted prisoners by casting them into

Massachusetts. This may be true. Massachusetts may not want

prisoners sent to its prisons in retaliation for their exercise of

constitutional rights, so it has some interest in adjudicating the

dispute.

         Third, Hannon has some interest in litigating in

Massachusetts to obtain convenient and effective relief. This

court “has repeatedly observed that a plaintiff’s choice of forum

must be accorded a degree of deference with respect to the issue of

its own convenience.” Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395. At the time this

action was filed and the district court dismissed Hannon’s claims

against Beard and Hesse, Hannon was incarcerated in Massachusetts.

Over his objection, he has since been transferred to New Jersey.

However, he still has legal counsel in Massachusetts, where the

rest of this action is being litigated. He therefore maintains a

valid interest in litigating his claims in Massachusetts, and we

owe some deference to his choice of forum.

         Fourth, litigating this issue in Massachusetts would

promote the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most

effective resolution of the controversy. Hannon has an attorney in

Massachusetts and this case has been litigated in Massachusetts for

several years already. Changing venue at this point may entail

substantial judicial resources and it may be most effective to keep

the action in Massachusetts. There is no reason that the

Massachusetts court cannot effectively resolve a dispute between

Hannon and Beard.

         Finally, the interests of all sovereigns in promoting

substantive social policies may weigh slightly in Hannon’s favor.

The substantive social policy, that transfers pursuant to the

Compact should not be effected for illegal or retaliatory purposes,

suggests that this issue could be litigated in Massachusetts.

However, this factor does not weigh particularly in Hannon’s favor

because the same interest would be served in a Pennsylvania

district court.

         Overall, the reasonableness factors weigh in Hannon’s

favor. Therefore, because Hannon’s claims are related to Beard’s

contacts, and Beard purposefully availed himself of the privilege

of doing business in Massachusetts, we hold that it would not

offend due process to assert personal jurisdiction over Beard.

III. 

         Because an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Beard

is authorized by the Massachusetts long-arm statute, and because it

comports with constitutional due process, we reverse the district

court’s order dismissing Hannon’s claims against Beard for lack of

personal jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings. However,

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hannon’s claim against

Hesse because the Massachusetts long-arm statute does not permit an

assertion of personal jurisdiction over her.

         REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART. Each

party should bear its own costs.

Footnotes

[1] 'Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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