Aucoin vs. Haney, (5th Cir. 2004)
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* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR .
R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED March 30, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-31040 (Summary Calendar) GREGORY P. AUCOIN, Plaintiff, versus PHIL HANEY, Individually and in his capacity as District Attorney for the 16th Judicial District Court, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDÂ’S LONDON, Subscribing to Color Note, Certificate and/or Policy No. CEM 701, Endorsement No. 14542 and Authorization # CP 9907770-A, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (00-CV-698) Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * As third party plaintiff, District Attorney Phil Haney appeals the district court§ 1983 claims of Plaintiff Gregory P. Aucoin. We affirm.
I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS After HaneyÂ’s precedessor as district attorney for LouisianaÂ’s 16th Judicial Distric t Court resigned in mid-term, Haney became acting district attorney and anno unced his candidacy to fill his predecessorÂ’s unexpire d term. According to Aucoin, HaneyÂ’s predecessor talked with Aucoin, a 20-year assistant district attorney in the same office, urging that he either support HaneyÂ’s election bid or resign. Aucoin alleged that he declined this suggestion and therea fter rejected HaneyÂ’s entreaty of political support, whereupon Haney fired Aucoin.
Aucoin sued Haney in federal district court, alleging various constitutional violations, each of which stemmed from Aucoin’s firing by Han ey for failure to support Haney’s candidacy for district attorney (and, apparently, for supporting an opposition candidate). Haney requested that Underwriters provide defense and indemnification under its lawyers professional liability insurance policy (the “policy”), but Underwriters declined based on (1) the policy’s express exclusi ons of claims related to employment practices, and (2) Haney’s predecessor’s rejection of employm ent practices coverage when that policy was applied for and obtained to cover legal claims arising fr om professional liability, personal injury, disciplinary proceedings, punitive damages, and criminal defense.
The district court denied HaneyÂ’s motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of AucoinÂ’s suit or, altern atively, a grant of qualified immunity, and Haney appealed to us. We reversed the district court, holding that Haney had not violated AucoinÂ’s First Amendment rights, and rem anded to the district court for further consistent proceedings. 1 Haney pursued his third party demand against Underwriters to recov er attorneysÂ’ fees and other costs and expenses incurred in his successful defense of AucoinÂ’s claims. Haney and Underwriters filed opposing motions for summary judgment, each re lying principally on the language of the policy and the application of the district attorneyÂ’s office for professional liability coverage.
The district court denied HaneyÂ’s summary judgment motion and granted UnderwritersÂ’s, dismissing HaneyÂ’s claims in their entirety. Haney timely filed a notice of appeal.
II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review Our employment of the de novo standard of review of a district courtÂ’s grant of summary judgment is too well known to require citation. Here, the applicability of de novo review is all the more obvious, given that neither party asserted the existence of factual disputes, so that the outcome turned on undispute d facts and contractual interpretation of the subject insurance policy and related documents.
B. Discussion It took the district court only seven pages of double-spaced, typewritten, letter-size stock (2-1/2 of which pages were devoted to a long-form re iteration of the summary judgment standard that both we and the district court employ) to explicate pellucidly its grant of Underwriters’s motion for summary judgment and its denial of Haney’s. Our careful review of the district court’s ruling, the summary judgment record, and the arguments advanced by the parties’ respe ctive counsel in their appellate briefs convinces us beyond cavil that the district court was correct in all respects. That court charitably characterized Haney’s interpretation of the policy as “highly doubtful” and his arguments as “unusual.” We shall be more frank: Haney’s appellate arguments and his characterization of the provisions of the subject insurance policy and application are sophistry incarnate. Not only did the insured affirmatively decline coverage of employment practices claims, the policy itself expressly, unequivocally, and unambiguously excludes employment claims of every nature from its coverage. And, we are satisfied that, as a matter of law, there can be no non-frivolous contention that the claims asserted by Aucoin were anything other than employment claims, pure and simple: Haney fired Aucoin when he refused to support Haney’s election bid, and all of Aucoin’s judicially asserted claims arose from or were connected with that termination of his employment. III. CONCLUSION For ess entially the same reasons advanced by the district court in its succinct yet completely definitive Memorandum Ruling, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Underwriters, dismissing Haney’s claims for costs and expens es incurred in defending Aucoin’s lawsuit.
AFFIRMED, at HaneyÂ’s cost.
1 See Aucoin v. Haney , 306 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2002)
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