Archer v. Fischer, (2nd Cir. 2009)

Federal Circuits

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07-2657-pr

Archer v. Fischer

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED

AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT

CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION

MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION: "(SUMMARY ORDER)."

UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE

WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV), THE

PARTY CITING THE SUMMARY ORDER MUST FILE AND SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER

WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED. IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE

AVAILABILITY OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT

DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States

Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the

10th day of April, two thousand nine.

PRESENT:

HON. ROBERT D. SACK,

HON. BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

Circuit Judges,

HON. DENISE COTE, District Judge.* MAYNARD ARCHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, - v - No. 07-2657-pr BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee. Appearing for Appellant: Maynard Archer, Brooklyn, NY, pro se, on submission.

Appeal from the United States District Court of the Northern District of New York (Gary L. Sharpe, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be, and it hereby is, AFFIRMED.

Maynard Archer, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the judgment of the district court dismissing his amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The defendant appellee, who was not served in this matter, did not appear in district court, and has not filed a brief in this Court. We assume the familiarity of the parties and counsel with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case, the opinions below, and the issues raised on this appeal.

We review a section 1915(e) dismissal de novo. Giano v.

Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). A de novo review of the record and relevant case law establishes that the district court properly dismissed Archer's amended complaint. In his amended complaint, Archer challenged the loss of his "good-time credits" and sought monetary damages. The claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (holding that a section 1983 action seeking money damages is not cognizable if a favorable decision would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] conviction or sentence," unless such conviction has previously been invalidated), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (applying Heck to a suit challenging the procedural defects at a prison disciplinary proceeding at which an inmate's good-time credits were revoked).

Archer's claim on appeal that he is only challenging the allegedly inadequate procedures that resulted in the revocation of his good-time credits, and not the revocation itself, fails.

The Supreme Court, in Edwards, rejected the distinction between claiming an improper procedure and claiming an improper result, because "it disregards the possibility, clearly envisioned by Heck, that the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment." Edwards, 520 U.S. at 645. The Supreme Court concluded that because the principal procedural defect complained of by Edwards "would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits," id. at 646, Edwards' suit was not cognizable under section 1983. Id. at 646-49. In light of the fact that Archer's challenge to the district court's ruling is foreclosed by principles articulated by the Supreme Court, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of the Court By:

* Honorable Denise Cote, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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